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ABSTRACT 
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value: Evidence from publicly listed Nordic companies 
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Economies across the Nordics have experienced sluggish growth after the financial cri-
sis and with plenty of cheap financing available, managers seek growth from mergers 
and acquisitions. Existing literature on mergers and acquisitions is abundant, however, 
the Nordic market has not been studied to the same extent. This study addresses the 
question whether mergers and acquisitions create value for shareholders and further-
more aims to shed light on how transaction and company specific factors contribute to 
that value. 
 
The study uses data of 144 acquisition events that took place between 2005 and 2010 
with acquirers listed in Copenhagen, Helsinki and Stockholm stock exchanges. The im-
pact of the events was measured with event study methodology in a three day event 
window, 120 day estimation window and 5 minute timestep interval. Standardized cu-
mulative abnormal returns are used as a proxy for value creation with a premise that 
investors’ are able to capture the long-term benefits of the acquisition and furthermore 
reflect it to the price of the underlying stock.  
 
The study finds that the sample acquisitions create standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns of 0.21% on an aggregate level with a strong reaction during the first 15 minutes 
after the acquisition announcement. Furthermore, our cross-sectional analysis indicated 
that transactions that used hybrid financing as consideration create greater returns com-
pared to cash or stock financed transactions. Moreover the study finds that cross-border 
acquisitions create less value compared to non-cross border acquisitions. In addition 
target and offer type did not provide statistically significant impact on shareholder val-
ue. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
TAMPEREEN TEKNILLINEN YLIOPISTO  
Tuotantotalouden koulutusohjelma 
NORRI, MIKAEL: Yritysostojen vaikutus osakasarvoon 
Diplomityö, 68 sivua, 3 liitesivua 
Marraskuu 2016 
Pääaine: Talouden ja liiketoiminnan hallinta 
Tarkastaja: Professori Juho Kanniainen 
Avainsanat: Yrityskaupat, ostotarjous, tapahtumatutkimus 
 
Pohjoismaiset taloudet ovat kärsineet matalasta talouskasvusta finanssikriisin jälkeises-
sä maailmassa. Tästä johtuen yritysten orgaaninen kasvu on ollut heikkoa ja siksi ne 
turvautuvat enenevässä määrin yrityskauppoihin tukeutuen saatavilla olevaan halpaan 
rahoitukseen. Maailmanlaajuisesti yrityskaupat ovat kattavasti tutkittu aihe, kuitenkin 
pohjoismaissa lisätutkimukselle on tilaa. Tämä tutkimus käsittelee aihetta yleistasolla 
sekä porautuu yrityskauppojen ominaisuuksiin ja niiden vaikutukseen tarkemmin. Tut-
kimus pyrkii vastaamaan kysymyksiin tuottavatko yrityskaupat lisäarvoa osakkeenomis-
tajilleen ja miten yrityksen ja yrityskaupan tarkemmat ominaisuudet vaikuttavat lisäar-
von tuottamiseen. 
 
Tutkimus pohjautuu vuodesta 2005 vuoteen 2010 ilmoitettuun 144 yrityskauppatiedot-
teeseen kolmessa eri pohjoismaiden pörssissä, Suomessa, Ruotsissa ja Tanskassa. Yri-
tyskauppojen vaikutusta mitattiin tapahtumatutkimuksella, jossa käytettiin kolmen päi-
vän tapahtumaikkunaa, 120 päivän arviointi-ikkunaa ja viiden minuutin intervallia mit-
tauksien välissä. Tutkimus käyttää standardoituja kumulatiivisia epänormaaleja tuottoja 
arvon luomisen mittaamiseen, sillä oletuksella, että sijoittajat pystyvät heijastamaan 
yrityskauppojen pitkän aikavälin hyödyt ja haitat osakkeen hintaan välittömästi kaupan-
tapahtumisen jälkeen. 
 
Tutkitut yrityskaupat tuottavat kokonaistasolla 0.21% standardoidun kumulatiivisen 
epänormaalin tuoton kolmen päivän tapahtumaikkunassa. Tutkimalla tuottoja tarkem-
min huomaamme, että ensimmäisen viiden minuutin aikana osakkeen hinnassa on voi-
makas ylöspäin suuntautunut reaktio, jonka jälkeen kokonaistuotto laskee aina tapahtu-
maikkunan loppuun saakka. Tämän lisäksi poikkileikkausanalyysimme mukaan hybridi-
rahoitus tuottaa parempia tuottoja verrattuna täysin käteisellä tai osakkeilla maksettuun 
kauppahintaan. Myös ulkomaille suuntautuvat yrityskaupat todettiin tuottavan huonom-
paa tuottoa kuin kotimaassa tapahtuvat yrityskaupat. Kohteen ja yrityskaupan tyyppiä 
tutkittaessa ei löydetty tilastollisesti merkitseviä tuloksia. 
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This quote is aimed at all my loved ones who will most probably end up reading only 
the abstract and the preface. However I would like to thank that same group of people 
for motivating me to finish this multi-year project. 
 
“Get your facts first, then you can distort them as you please.”  
 
A quote by Mark Twain summarizes how many things in this world work, however this 
thesis had a total opposite aim. Objectivity is not always easy, however, university and 
especially the examiner of this thesis, prof. Juho Kanniainen, have given me tools to 
succeed in this goal. 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research question.............................................................................................. 1 
1.3 Research methodology ...................................................................................... 2 
1.4 Key concepts ..................................................................................................... 3 
1.4.1 Takeovers ............................................................................................. 4 
1.4.2 Buy-outs ............................................................................................... 4 
1.4.3 Tender offer ......................................................................................... 5 
1.5 A review of existing research ............................................................................ 5 
1.6 Structure of the thesis ........................................................................................ 9 
2 Theoretical background ........................................................................................... 11 
2.1 M&A Process .................................................................................................. 11 
2.2 Rationale and value creation for acquisitions and tender offers ..................... 12 
2.2.1 Synergy benefits ................................................................................ 13 
2.2.2 Managerial hubris .............................................................................. 15 
2.2.3 Management empire building and compensation .............................. 16 
2.3 Valuation ......................................................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Illiquidity discount ............................................................................. 17 
2.4 Signaling ......................................................................................................... 18 
2.5 Financing decision .......................................................................................... 19 
2.6 Challenges of mergers and acquisitions .......................................................... 20 
2.7 Market efficiency ............................................................................................ 26 
2.8 Information asymmetry ................................................................................... 27 
3 Charasteristics of the Nordic M&A Market ............................................................ 28 
3.1 Nordic M&A market general characteristics .................................................. 28 
3.2 Market size and deal flow ............................................................................... 28 
4 Hypotheses .............................................................................................................. 32 
5 Data and Methodology ............................................................................................ 35 
5.1 Data description .............................................................................................. 35 
5.2 Data gathering and variables ........................................................................... 40 
5.2.1 Variables ............................................................................................ 40 
5.2.2 Control variables ................................................................................ 40 
5.3 Event study analysis ........................................................................................ 40 
5.4 Cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns .................................................. 45 
6 Results and Discussion ............................................................................................ 47 
6.1 Total sample returns ........................................................................................ 47 
6.2 Cross-sectional analysis .................................................................................. 49 
6.3 Summary of results and discussion ................................................................. 51 
7 Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 56 
vi 
 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 58 
Appendix 1: List of Companies included in the Sample ................................................ 66 
Appendix 2: List of indices Used .................................................................................... 67 
Appendix 3: Delistings .................................................................................................... 68 
 
1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the reader to the subject and gives background on the study. The 
research questions, methodology and the structure of the thesis will also be briefly cov-
ered in this chapter. A review of existing studies on the respective subject is also pre-
sented in the last subchapter. 
1.1 Background 
With sluggish organic growth in Nordic economies, companies are seeking growth from 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). According to Thomson Reuters (2014) companies 
hold $7.5 trillion cash at hand globally of which a large amount will likely be disposed 
in merger and acquisition transactions. 
 
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the activity in the field of mergers and 
acquisitions fluctuates in waves; when the stock markets are booming more acquisitions 
occur opposed to bear market conditions. According to Mergermarket (2013) the global 
M&A market peaked in 2007 and after the financial crisis, deals have been scarce with 
some rebound in the past few years. Going in to a possible M&A revival a question 
arises: do acquisitions create value, and if so, what kinds of deals generate largest re-
turns? This paper aims to contribute to the subject by examining how acquisitions and 
tender offers affect the returns of a stock after a M&A deal, i.e. shareholder value, using 
the Nordic M&A market as a reference point. 
 
Merger and acquisitions deals are driven by the expected future cash flow of the target 
i.e. the returns on the acquired company or asset. Acquirers have distinct motives to 
pursue a M&A deal, such as synergy benefits or entering a new market with the ultimate 
main rationale behind most of the motives is to increase shareholder value. However 
acquisitions have their challenges, such as the managements willingness to increase its’ 
prestige or cash in on their stock options. The actual returns generated by an M&A 
transaction can be evaluated with abnormal returns, which this study also uses as a 
proxy for value generation, to get a sense of the actual return M&A deals generate. 
1.2 Research question  
The underlying subject of this study has been examined broadly by academics and vari-
ous studies exist with several approaches, varying from short time frame to long time 
frame studies as well as acquirer to target perspective. However the Nordic M&A mar-
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ket has not been in the focus of such studies and only a few studies exist covering the 
respective market. Thus the focus of this thesis is on mergers and acquisitions that oc-
curred in Finland, Sweden and Denmark with several different variables. Additionally 
very few studies have been conducted with a five minute time step interval, enabling us 
to observe the immediate reaction of the investors. 
 
The study examines how M&A transactions have created wealth in general as well as 
immerses in more detailed variables affecting wealth creation. The goal of this thesis is 
two-fold: 
 
 To examine if M&A transactions create or destroy value and if so, how much. 
Value creation is defined as abnormal returns during event window, which are 
examined by applying event study methodology to capture the returns. 
 To examine the contribution of acquisition event specific factors to value crea-
tion in M&A transactions. 
 
Answering these two questions will enable us to examine what type of acquisitions ben-
efit shareholders most and which acquisitions should not be carried out as well as give 
us the reference point to discuss why some type of acquisitions create more value op-
posed to other. 
1.3 Research methodology 
The choice of research method is intuitive since the data used is mainly in quantitative 
form; stock data is used to calculate the abnormal returns. Consequently a statistical 
research method, such as an event study, suits the purpose of this thesis adequately. 
Zollo and Meier (2008) reviewed 87 studies on M&A performance and they find that 
41% of these studies used event study methodology in short-term studies, which gives 
confidence to our chosen methodology. Additionally MacKinlay (1997) suggest that 
event-studies are most useful in corporate finance context due to direct measure of 
shareholder value. 
 
The empirical nature of the study that aims to support or reject a hypothesis, suggests 
that a nomothetic approach suits the means of this study. In a nomothetic study a large 
sample of data is studied and based on the results, generalizations are made to support 
or reject the hypotheses.  
 
The research advances in an order where content is analyzed first, followed by the event 
study and statistical analysis. The content analysis comprises of collecting the merger 
and acquisition events and categorizing them into suitable categories. In this study the 
content consist of stock exchange releases of mergers and acquisitions that have oc-
curred in the NASDAQ OMXH Nordic stock exchange. The event study calculates the 
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abnormal returns of the studied securities in cases of an unanticipated event (the M&A 
event), using the time, date and ISIN-code of the studied security as variables and statis-
tical analysis to compare and validate the results.  
 
Event studies have also received criticism inter alia from Krishnakumar and Sethi 
(2012) who note that event studies require efficient markets, which is often not the case 
in mergers and acquisitions transactions where the deal information is often leaked to 
certain parties before official announcement. Furthermore event studies do not take ac-
tual firm performance into account, but rather measure only investor reactions. 
1.4 Key concepts 
The definition of Mergers & Acquistions is interpreted according to the author and con-
text. In this thesis we use the following definitions: An acquisition is a transaction in 
which the bidding company acquires some or all of the target company’s share capital. 
If the bidder acquires a majority of the target’s shares, the control of the target company 
transfers to the acquirer. In a minority transaction the target is also subject to the acquir-
ers influence.  
 
Mergers are transactions in which one of the companies is merged to the other firm. In 
other word one of the companies ceases to exist after the deal. Mergers and acquisitions 
can be pursued with several approaches. The target can be absorbed to the existing 
company and the previous legal entity is discontinued. The target can also act under its 
previous legal entity and the operations are integrated to the acquirers operations. In 
some cases a new special purpose vehicle (SPV) is established and all of the share capi-
tal or assets of the target firm are transferred to the respective SPV. SPV’s can be used 
as a way to enter a regulated market e.g. China. For example when the technology com-
pany Alibaba wanted to list itself in a stock exchange located in the United States, it had 
to establish a holding company that owns all of Alibaba’s share capital. Investors could 
then own shares in the respective holding company making them indirect shareholders 
in Alibaba. Such an arrangement was necessary due to Chinese market regulation. 
 
SPV’s are used mostly by private equity investors due to the nature of their business. 
They hold multiple companies form several industries with various financing structures 
and consequently it is rational to establish a new company to manage the acquired com-
pany. Certain corporate restructurings are sometimes considered as a part of the M&A 
field; however this thesis concentrates in the aforementioned concepts, and excludes 
corporate restructurings. 
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1.4.1 Takeovers 
Takeovers are described as an event that is characterized by the bidding company to 
acquire a controlling stake of the target company. Takeovers can be categorized as 
friendly or hostile.  
 
A Friendly bid is an offer by the bidding company in which the bid is approved by the 
targets’ management and the bid is carried out with cooperation between the two parties 
involved.  The process of a friendly bid is usually carried out in the following order: 
First the bidding company approaches the targets board of directors, who evaluate the 
sufficiency of the offer. If the offer is considered to be in the best interest of the targets 
shareholders, the bid will be extended to the shareholders and either recommended or 
disapproved by the board of directors. An example of a friendly bid is Microsoft’s offer  
of Nokias Device and Service division in 2013, which was completed in 2014. 
 
A Hostile bid or Unsolicited bid is characterized by its’ straightforward nature. In such 
an offer the acquirer approaches the shareholders of the target company directly without 
the involvement of the targets management. In such cases the targets management might 
conduct some counteractions such as divesting a part of the company or becoming the 
bidder. Counteractions to hostile bids are discussed later on in this thesis. An example 
of a hostile bid is Weir’s bid on Metso’s mining divisions in which the shareholders 
were contacted directly before discussing the offer with the board. 
 
The distinction between a friendly and a hostile bid is rather important since in a hostile 
bid the bidder does not have as much information on the target as in a friendly bid, due 
to the lack of cooperation and information sharing with the management of the target. 
This in turn might affect the underlying bid price i.e. the returns for both parties in-
volved. 
1.4.2 Buy-outs 
Buy-outs are usually conducted by a group of investors or a private equity company. 
The definition of a buyout is determined by the group of investors acquiring the compa-
ny. Buyouts usually involve using a substantial amount of debt, that consists of different 
debt vehicles such as senior notes and mezzanine debt. Subsequently the equity portion 
of the deal is usually rather small. According to existing literature (Sudarsanam 2003) 
the following types of buyouts can be considered most common. 
 
The leveraged buyout is an acquisition of an asset or a company financed mostly with 
cash. As mentioned afore the financing consists of various debt instruments and a small 
portion of equity, usually raised from private investors, hence the companies managing 
the funds are called private equity firms.  Leverage buyouts have several benefits to 
support them such as leverage, tax benefits, usage of various financial instruments and 
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aligning the firm strategically for a better performance. (Sudarsanam 2003, pp. 268 - 
271) 
 
The management buyout (MBO) is a type of leverage buyout where the target compa-
ny’s incumbent management takes the initiative usually with the help of a private equity 
company. A management buyout can be a defense mechanism against hostile bids from 
other acquirers as in the LBO of RJR Nabisco, in which RJR’s management of the time 
competed against a bid from a private equity firm KKR.  
 
In a management buy-in (MBI) the target company’s management will be replaced with 
a new management by the LBO-sponsor, for the current managers might not be compe-
tent or ineffective. A combination of MBO and MBI can be implemented resulting into 
a situation where the new management is a combination of old and new management. 
This kind of a buyout is called buy-in-management-buyout (BIMBO). 
 
Buyouts differ from acquisitions with a distinguished holding period and exit strategies. 
Opposed to industrial, strategic acquisitions, buyouts often cash in on the deal after a 
distinct holding period. Usual avenues of exit are trade sale to a strategic buyer, taking 
the company public or selling the company to another private equity investor.  
1.4.3 Tender offer 
Tender offer is a solicitation by the acquirer to purchase a substantial amount of a tar-
gets’ shares. The offer is at a fixed price and usually involves a premium over the pre-
vailing market price. (SEC 2014) The difference between a tender offer and an acquisi-
tion is the communication of the bid. In an acquisition the targets’ management is con-
tacted and after the bid is either sponsored by the management or rejected where as in a 
tender offer the offer is communicated directly to stockholders. Thus tender offers are 
often used to carry out hostile takeovers. The aforementioned buy-outs are often con-
ducted with tender offers as well. (Damoradan 2005) 
1.5 A review of existing research 
Mergers and acquistions (M&A) have been extensively studied since the 1970’s domi-
nated by the use of event studies. However the Nordic market has not been studied with 
the same breadth. Additionally the information acquired from the time period between 
1970’s and 1990’s might not be as relevant since the M&A market has developed rapid-
ly with globalization, advanced decision making and increased involvement of private 
equity. 
 
Returns for target firms 
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Returns concerning the target of an acquisition are intuitively positive and usually a 
premium of 20% - 30% is considered justifiable. The abundant existing literature sug-
gests somewhat similar results. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find 20% positive returns in 
their study and Jensen and Ruback (1983) arrive at a similar result on their survey of 13 
separate studies. Dodd and Ruback’s (1977) research fortify the same magnitude of re-
turns. However Lyyras (1999) study of Finnish M&A during 1985-1996 reports a 7% 
abnormal return for target company’s shareholders, which is significantly lower com-
pared to returns found in other studies. This in turn leads us to a question whether the 
returns in the Finnish and Nordic market follow different pattern compared to more 
studied markets such as the US market. 
 
Returns for bidding firms 
 
On the acquirer side the returns are intuitively lower since the bidder has to pay a pre-
mium to close the deal. Jarren and Poulsen (1989) find that the average abnormal return 
for the acquirer between years 1960-1985 is 1.14% and even negative in the 1980’s. 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) find negative returns on a five year period after the an-
nouncement. This result must be considered with caution since it uses a longer event 
window than this thesis and hence is not fully comparable. Also in such a long event 
window other announcement and confounding events influence the returns, which in 
turn denote that the credibility of the result must be disputed. In contrast Rau and Ver-
melen (1998) find that in a three year event window yields a return of 8 percent. This is 
similar with a study conducted with a Finnish sample by Karppinen (2001) who finds 
that tender offers yield a positive 5.4 percent positive abnormal return for the acquirer. 
A recent study of Finnish M&A by Hänninen (2014) suggests a similar pattern of posi-
tive cumulative abnormal returns for such transactions. Additionally positive or zero 
effects have been found by Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), Macqueira et al (1998), 
Schwert (2000), Loderer and Martin (1990). Negative returns are found by Walker 
(2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Sirowe (1997) and Healy et al. (1992). 
 
Financing decision 
 
Carleton et al. (1983) argue that the financing decision of an acquisition, i.e. is the deal 
consideration financed with cash or stock, is essential when distinguishing the charac-
teristics of a deal.  Financing decisions in acquisitions have been broadly studied and 
present controversial findings. For example Eckbo et al. (1990, 2000) suggests that bid-
der gains are greatest when executing acquisitions with stock deal or a deal with combi-
nation of stock and cash. However Travlos (1987) and Moeller et al. (2004) present evi-
dence that bidder returns are higher in cash offers compared to a hybrid financing or an 
all-stock deal.  For the target Huang and Walking (1987), Eckbo and Langohr (1989) 
and Andrade et al. (2001) find that cash deals give better returns for the target, com-
pared to stock deals. 
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These kind of controversies are often explained with tax benefits and information 
asymmetries as well as with a bigger premium in cash deals because of the “tax penal-
ty”. Hansen, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Eckbo et al., 1990 have studied information asym-
metry’s role in the choice of financing an acquisition. They conclude that abnormal re-
turns consist of two components: signaling and synergy valuation. Eckbo (1990) states 
that mergers which are financed with cash, do not have the signaling effect, because the 
value of the target is easily visible and the acquirer does not have as big of a risk in 
overpaying. Delcoure and Hunsader (2006) find evidence that in cash deals’ the most 
important determinant is the target industry. Bruner (2004) study suggests a similar pat-
tern by observing the consolidations on different decades. 
 
Cross-border returns 
 
Comparing cross-border and domestic returns is relevant since the rationale for the ac-
quisition might be different. Danbolt (1966) finds that target company’s shareholders 
gain 6 to 11 percentage points more in cross-border acquisitions compared to domestic 
M&A deals. Harris and Ravencraft (1991) argue that the abnormal returns of cross-
border mergers and domestic ones do not have significant difference in returns for the 
target. This suggests a different pattern from Danbolts study, which finds that cross-
border M&A creates higher value compared to domestic deals. Georgen and Renneboog 
(2004) find that in Europe cross-border mergers yield a 9% return for the targets share-
holders, but only 0.7% for the bidders. This is in contradiction with the findings of 
Danbolt. Kang (1993) suggests that cross-border acquisitions are expected to generate 
more wealth than domestic acquisitions due to the fact that multinational firms tend to 
have competitive advantage over local ones. In a study of emerging market cross-border 
acquisitions Aybar and Ficici (2009) argue that the returns on the day of the announce-
ment are negative to the acquirer. The volatility of the results are most likely skewed 
since the timings of the studies are decades apart, but also because cross-border mergers 
entail more risk and thus the returns of such deals have greater variance. 
 
Private firm acquisition returns 
 
Fuller et al. (2002) find that bidder gains when buying a private firm but loses when 
acquiring a public one. They argue that illiquidity of private companies is one of the 
reasons for a discount and hence the cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirer in 
private firm acquisitions are correlated positively with the size of the target. Similar 
results are found by Chang (1998) who finds that when private firms are acquired with 
cash significant positive returns are expected. When the consideration is paid with stock 
the returns are lower, but positive. Hansen and Lott (1996) find a similar pattern with 
Fuller (2000) in which when the bidder is acquiring a private firm bidders experience 2 
% higher returns than when acquiring a public one.  
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Private equity firm returns  
 
Humphery-Jenner et al. (2012) find that deals in which the acquirer is involved with 
private equity, yield better abnormal returns than those which have no private equity 
involvement. They argue that this is due to the access to expertise in deal making as 
well as the previous experience in similar deals. Renneboog et al. (2007) have evidence 
from U.K. that the firms going private due to a purchase of a private equity player yield 
a return of 30%. The high premium might be a result of the expected value creation pos-
sibilities the private equity shops anticipate. High value creation potential enables pri-
vate equity players to bid more and outmatch competing bids with a higher price. 
 
A summary of the literature review is presented in table 1. As a generalization it can be 
concluded that most of the studies show positive returns in an event of a M&A transac-
tion with variable magnitudes of returns. Especially an acquisition of a private firm ap-
pears to yield positive returns consistently, however the literature review has only a 
small sample of studies that have included private firm return examination. 
 
Table 1. Overview of the literature review (1/2). 
 
      
Target 
Author Subject Year Return 
Jarrell & Poulsen M&A general 1989 Positive 
Jensen & Ruback M&A general 1983 Positive 
Dodd & Ruback M&A general 1977 Positive 
Lyyra M&A general 1999 Positive 
Huang & Walking Financing decision 1987 Positive 
Eckbo & Langhor Financing decision 1989 Positive 
Andrade et al.  Financing decision 2001 Positive 
Delcoure & Hunsader Financing decision 2006 Positive 
Bruner Financing decision 2004 Positive 
Danbolt Cross-border 1966 Positive 
Harris & Ravencraft Cross-border 1991 Positive 
Georgen & Renneboog Cross-border 2004 Positive 
Humphery-Jenner et al.  Private Equity 2012 Positive 
Renneboog et al. Private Equity 2007 Positive 
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Table 1. Overview of the literature review (2/2.) 
 
Bidder 
Author Subject Year Return 
Jarrell & Poulsen M&A general 1989 Negative 
Dodd & Ruback M&A general 1977 Negative 
Rau & Vermelen M&A general 1998 Positive 
Karppinen M&A general 2001 Positive 
Hänninen M&A general 2014 Positive 
Eckbo & Thorburn M&A general 2000 Positive 
Macquiera et al.  M&A general 1998 Positive 
Schwert M&A general 2000 Positive 
Loderer & Martin M&A general 1990 Positive 
Walker M&A general 2000 Negative 
Mitchell & Stafford M&A general 2000 Negative 
Sirowe M&A general 1997 Negative 
Healy et al. M&A general 1992 Negative 
Eckbo et al.  Financing decision 1990, 2000 Negative 
Travlos Financing decision 1987 Positive 
Moeller et al. Financing decision 2004 Positive 
Hansen Financing decision 1987 
 Fishman Financing decision 1989 
 Georgen & Renneboog Cross-border 2004 Positive 
Kang Cross-border 1993 Positive 
Aybar & Ficici Cross-border 2009 Negative 
Fuller M&A general 2002 Negative 
Fuller Private 2002 Positive 
Chang Private 1998 Positive 
Hansen & Lott Private 1996 Positive 
Fuller Private 2000 Positive 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
After the introduction the thesis covers relevant theoretical background of mergers and 
acquisitions, starting with the key concepts and continuing to the rationale and value 
drivers of M&A transactions. Additionally chapter 2 covers the possible challenges of 
mergers and acquisitions that might affect the outcome of a transaction as well as the 
financing decision that is of great relevance when examining the respective transactions. 
Illiquidity of an asset is also discussed due to its relevance in studying acquisitions of 
private firms. Information asymmetry and efficient markets theories are also discussed 
in the same chapter since they present the core to an event study and without under-
standing and accepting such postulates studying returns would be groundless.  
 
10 
 
Chapter 3 describes the characteristics of the Nordic merger and acquisition market for 
the purpose of one to be able to get a sense of the deal flow and value as well as to be 
able to compare the Nordic market to other markets of the world and furthermore 
benchmark the liquidity of the market, which supposedly affects returns. Chapter 3 also 
gives a general overview of the market cycle and helps us understand the prevailing 
market sentiment of the underlying markets. Studying market cycles is important to 
understand since in a bull market opportunistic acquisitions are more common. The hy-
potheses are underlined in chapter 4, whereas chapter 5 presents the characteristics of 
the data that is used in the underlying study and describes the event study methodology 
which is used in the empirical part of the thesis. Chapter 6 presents the results and dis-
cusses them, as well as reflects them to the existing literature and hypotheses. Finally 
the last chapter, chapter 7, concludes. 
 11 11  
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter introduces the basic concepts of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and pro-
vides a basis for understanding the rationale as well as the sources of value in an M&A 
transaction. Later on the chapter discusses the financing decision of a transaction as well 
as describes the concepts of market efficiency and information asymmetry. 
2.1 M&A Process 
The M&A process varies across companies and type of M&A. Immonen (2008) deter-
mines the process into three steps; Planning phase, execution phase and adaption phase. 
Each phase contains several actions that are executed in order to see the acquisition 
through. Table 2 outlines the process main and sub-phases. 
 
Table 2: The M&A process phases (after Immonen 2008) 
M&A process phases         
     Planning 
 
 Execution 
 
Adaption 
  
 
   
Determination of 
strategy 
 
 
Negotiation  
process 
 
Integration and after-
care 
Target  
screening 
 
 Due diligence 
  
Valuation of target and 
synergies 
 
 Executing the deal 
  
Planning the transac-
tion structure 
 
       
 
The planning phase usually starts by identifying the strategic need for an acquisition and 
setting the objective for the acquisition. Strategy and objective setting is vital in order to 
conduct the screening phase effectively. Screening is done according to distinct criteria, 
which usually include target size, growth profile and industry as well as competitive 
position and geography. After identifying the financial position and future growth pro-
spects, the potential synergies and implied valuation can be determined. (Immonen 
2008) 
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The execution phase consists of negotiation, due diligence and execution of the deal. 
The negotiation phase includes agreeing on the term of the transaction, such as price, 
payment method and consideration details. Due diligence is usually done by a third par-
ty in order to warrant the terms of the acquisition and financial, tax and legal condition 
of the target. Due diligence also ensures the correct adjustments to the purchase price, 
such as net debt and working capital adjustments. 
 
The integration phase initiates after the closing of the transaction. The integration phase 
is vital for the success of an acquisition for several factors influence a successful inte-
gration. Many of the most crucial determinants of a successful acquisition are tacit fac-
tors, including management, leadership and organizational culture (Waldman & Javi-
dan, 2009). Gates & Very (2003) argue that in fact many acquisitions are unsuccessful 
and fail to show synergies due to an insufficient adaptation phase. The challenges of 
M&A are discussed more in detail later on in this thesis. 
2.2 Rationale and value creation for acquisitions and 
tender offers 
This chapter discusses why a company should pursue a merger or an acquisition. The 
motives for M&A transactions are abundant, but according to Ianotta (2010) and Bhide 
(1993) synergy benefits are the most common reasons for such transactions. Tax bene-
fits are also a commonly referred motive to conduct transactions. The recent evidence of 
U.S. firms executing cross-border acquisitions to gain tax benefits (e.g. Pfizers bid on 
AstraZeneca) raises a question whether Nordic companies are in search of such benefits 
(Wall Street Journal 2014). 
 
Another most important question when undertaking an acquisition or a merger is the 
sources of value that derives from the deal. The sources of value in an acquisition or a 
merger can be simply divided into revenue enhancing and cost reducing drivers. Reve-
nue enhancing value is harder to perceive and calculate, but it still plays a great role 
especially in strategic acquisitions. Cost reduction usually is related to synergies that 
derive from consolidation of businesses. Trautwein (1990), Brouthers et al. (1998) and 
Walter & Barney (1990) have made distinct classification systems, but in this thesis 
value creation is classified in the aforementioned way. 
 
Takeovers are said to have a disciplining effect on the management because takeovers 
remove managers who either pursue interests in their own benefit or use the company’s 
resources inefficiently. Therefore it is argued that takeovers mitigate the agency prob-
lem that is discussed later on in this chapter. However takeover market comes with 
problems such as the free rider problem presented by Grossman & Hart (1980). The free 
rider problem suggests that shareholders can benefit in an event of an acquisition by 
holding on to their shares and letting other shareholders sell their shares at a lower price. 
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Moreover, because all shareholders have the incentive to hold on to their shares, no one 
will sell creating a deadlock. 
 
The underlying assumption in this chapter is that acquisitions are done in order to in-
crease shareholder value. This implies that the value of the target combined with the 
premium has to be smaller than the gained benefits of the acquisition. Miller and Modi-
gliani (1958) argue that the value of a company is independent of its capital structure. 
Therefore in some academic studies it is assumed that restructuring the capital structure 
of a firm through an acquisition cannot create value in a takeover. However, when ob-
serving the actual market, capital structure can have effect in the value of companies. 
Hence the following hypotheses are considered as motivation for acquisitions. 
2.2.1 Synergy benefits 
The synergy benefits can be divided into two categories, operational synergies and fi-
nancial synergies. These two categories can be divided into revenue enhancing and cost 
reducing synergies. To put it simple the equity value post-acquisition must be bigger 
than the combined equity values of the target and the acquirer: 
 
𝐸(𝐶) > 𝐸(𝐴) + 𝐸(𝑇),        (1) 
 
where E(C) is the equity value of the post-acquisition company, E(A) and E(T) are the 
equity values of the acquirer and the target, respectively. According to formula 2, the 
value of the synergy benefits is 
 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐺𝑌 = 𝐸(𝐶) − (𝐸(𝐴) + 𝐸(𝑇)).      (2) 
 
Operational synergies are synergies that allow companies to increase their cash flows or 
reduce costs with operational maneuvers. The operational synergy benefits are ample, 
but compared to financial synergies more uncertain and less measurable. Operational 
synergies include: 
 
 Economies of scale that allow reduced costs in production due to consolidation 
of production and distribution network or combining the distribution network 
for wider reach. These kinds of synergies are most often foreseen in horizontal 
mergers such as an auto manufacturer acquires another auto manufacturer 
(Damodaran 2005). 
 Greater pricing power due to higher market share, i.e. less competition. These 
kinds of synergies also appear most often in horizontal takeovers. The fallback 
on this approach can be regulatory power in an event of a monopoly or an oli-
gopoly. (Damoradan 2005) 
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 Entering new product category or markets which could not be entered without 
an acquisition. Also other functional strengths that can be transferred after the 
acquisition can be accounted in this category.  
 Greater revenue in result of cross-selling. A company can use its’ reputed brand 
to leverage the products of the target firm as well as combine marketing efforts. 
(Sudarsanam 2003, p. 100-112). It must be noted that in practice investors view 
revenue synergies with great caution since revenue synergies are often hard to 
quantify and the realization of such synergies is uncertain compared to cost 
synergies. 
 
Financial synergies are a result of either a higher cash flow or reduced cost of capital or 
both. In contrast to operating synergies, financial synergies can be measured more accu-
rately and can be predicted in many cases. According to Damoradan (2005) they can be 
categorized in the following manner: 
 
 Allocation of funds: A firm with excess cash can allocate its’ cash reserves to a 
company with high return projects (and limited cash), creating a higher yield for 
the combined company. The higher yield derives from the projects that the high 
return firm could not have taken without the excess cash. 
 Increased debt capacity: The takeover can make cash flows more predictable and 
stable, which result into higher debt capacity that allows the company to benefit 
from a greater tax shield, hence get a lower cost of capital. 
 Tax benefits: Tax benefits can arrive through various avenues such as writing up 
targets’ assets or using the net operating losses to shelter profits. Additionally 
tax benefits can be gained by acquiring a company abroad as aforementioned. 
 Diversifying: A company can diversify its’ cash flows which makes the compa-
ny earnings less volatile. This synergy is mostly applicable in private firms since 
investors can diversify at a lower cost than the company itself. This can be done 
by investing in different type of assets or different industries. 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates synergies and their connections to adding value. It is important to 
understand what avenues of value creation managers try to capture when pursuing a 
acquisition in order to understand the rationale for the acquisition and moreover the 
risks involved.  
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Figure 1. Operational and Financial Synergies. (After Damoradan 2005)  
 
2.2.2 Managerial hubris 
The term hubris refers to managerial overconfidence that manifests itself when manag-
ers of the bidding company overestimate their ability to create value out of an acquisi-
tion; hence the hubris hypothesis suggests that decision makers of bidding firms pay too 
much for their targets (Sudarsanam 2003, p. 57). The hubris hypothesis is a behavioral 
approach in which the management does not deliberately act against the best interest of 
the bidders’ shareholder, but rather unintentionally takes actions that have negative or 
zero returns, in contrast to the management empire building and compensation schemes 
described in the next sub-chapter. 
 
Roll (1986) argues that this exact phenomenon is the reason why many acquisitions fail 
to create value for the bidders shareholders. Roll (1986) also finds that the hypothesis of 
bidders paying an unnecessary high premium effects the acquisition, so that the value of 
the target firm increases, the value of the acquiring company decreases and the total 
effect in value change is slightly negative. The minor negative returns can be linked to 
the transaction costs in the acquisition. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find evidence 
that supports Roll’s hypothesis; they suggest that takeover premiums are positively cor-
related with the parameters for hubris and argue that bigger takeover premiums result in 
bigger shareholder losses. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) use recent organizational suc-
cess, CEO’s self-importance and media praise for the CEO as proxies for hubris. 
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2.2.3 Management empire building and compensation 
The managerial perspective is related to agency theory in a controversial way; under 
this perspective acquisitions are considered as evidence of such problem. This theory is 
based on the notion that the managers of the acquiring company will lose or gain control 
in an event of an acquisition. Managers might lose control in an event of a merger and 
therefore might try to react in their own favor instead of the best interest of the share-
holders. For example managers might rather execute mergers with cash to gain control 
or reject cash bids from other bidders to retain control in their company. The latter one 
is not in the best interest of the shareholders since as discussed in the literature review 
cash bids tend to yield larger cumulative abnormal returns for the target. (Sudarsanam 
2003, s. 57-58) 
 
The managerial perspective differs from the hubris hypothesis in the intentions of the 
managers; Managerial perspective implies that managers deliberately act in their best 
interest to maximize their own utility, whilst the hubris hypothesis suggests that manag-
ers act against the best interest of the shareholders unbeknownst. (Seth et al. 2000) 
 
Two categories of self-maximizing managerial behavior associated with acquisitions 
can be recognized: diversification and empire building. Empire building reflects flawed 
managerial objectives by denoting that managers increase the scope and size of business 
that they control to the detriment of operational success, hence the value of the compa-
ny. Hope and Thomas (2008) argue that the respective behavior is made possible by 
inadequate or insufficient financial disclosures and other monitoring schemes. In other 
words the lack of transparency can feed self-maximizing managerial behavior. Accord-
ing to Jansen (1986) the respective behavior can be mitigated by either paying dividends 
i.e. getting rid of excess cash or increasing leverage. 
 
Moreover managers can diversify their firms cash flows, which leads to more stable 
earnings. (Seth et al. 2000) Diversification in general can be considered as managerial 
empire building since the rationale behind a single firm excessively diversifying is ill-
conceived due to the efficient capital markets; Investors have the ability to diversify 
their investments on their own with a lower cost. Levy & Sarnat (1970) find that con-
glomerate mergers that are made solely to diversify cannot create value in a perfect 
market. 
 
According to Amihud & Lev (1981) and Black (1989) another self-maximizing behav-
ior pattern in conglomerate mergers is related with the employment risk of the manager. 
Managers employment and hence earnings are correlated with the risk of the firm, as a 
result risk averse managers attempt to mitigate their employment risk by undertaking 
M&A transactions. 
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Self-maximizing behavior has been empirically studied by Lewellen & Rosenfeld 
(1985) and Firth (1991) with similar outcomes. Lewellen & Rosenfeld (1985) find that 
there is a significant positive correlation between the abnormal returns of a M&A trans-
action and the personal equity stake in the company of the managers. This in turn im-
plies that managers who do not hold a stake in the company act deliberately to gain in-
fluence with M&A. Firth (1991) found that even when shareholder wealth is destroyed 
in an M&A transaction executives gain rewards, which reinforces the motives for man-
agerial empire building. 
2.3 Valuation 
The valuation aspect does not derive as much from the internal factors of a company 
rather as it does from the markets sentiment against the company. Undervaluation can 
be a substantial value creator and acquirers, especially private equity companies, can 
benefit from this phenomenon.  
 
Undervaluation can stem from several factors such as the overall market sentiment, be-
ing a small part of a bigger conglomerate and as a result the valuation of the group drags 
the valuation of the part. Such discrepancies present an opportunity for value creation 
without any substantial maneuvers. To simulate the effect one can observe trading mul-
tiples: The acquirer is a large drug manufacturer trading with a multiple of 20.0x and the 
target is a small drug manufacturing division that is a part of a bigger conglomerate with 
a multiple of 10.0x. The deal was made with a multiple of 15.0x and after the deal the 
target would be absorbed to the large drug manufacturer and would trade with its multi-
ple of somewhere around 20.0x depending on the stock market reaction. However as we 
have concluded from the literature review usually the reaction is slightly positive. It can 
be argued that value has been created by just transferring the ownership from one com-
pany to another. 
 
The price at which a company is sold is not theoretical, but rather an agreement between 
two parties that are willing to trade an asset at an arm’s length basis. The respective 
definition results in situation where the price of an asset can be sold at a significantly 
higher or lower price than the intrinsic value of the company and its future cash flows. 
2.3.1 Illiquidity discount 
Valuation practitioners commonly refer to illiquidity discount, when valuing assets. An 
illiquidity discount can be relevant when valuing a small or otherwise illiquid asset. 
Illiquid asset can be defined for the purpose of this discussion as an asset that bears cost 
in any way in an event of a sale. In some sense all asset are illiquid, with the difference 
being the continuum, in which some assets are more liquid than other. 
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The trading costs for an asset comprise of components such as brokerage cost, bid-ask 
spread, price impact or opportunity costs, or a combination of them. Brokerage cost, 
which is a cost paid to the broker for connecting the seller and buyer, is the most explic-
it of the costs that any investor pays, but it is usually a rather minor portion of the costs. 
In mergers and acquisitions this costs can be thought of as the fee for the M&A advi-
sors. Smaller targets might have higher proportionate brokerage costs since advisors 
have minimum fees no matter what the actual purchase price is. (Damoradan 2010) 
 
Bid-Ask spread denotes the spread between the price at which you can buy an asset (the 
dealer’s ask price) and the price at which you can sell the same asset at the same point 
in time (the dealer’s bid price). The bid ask spread is relevant when observing public 
takeovers in which the owners of the target are reluctant to sell at the same price as the 
bidder is willing to bid. The price impact that an investor can create by trading on an 
asset, pushing the price up when buying the asset and pushing it down while selling. 
There is the opportunity cost associated with waiting to trade. While being a patient 
trader may reduce the previous two components of trading cost, the waiting can cost 
profits both on trades that are made and in terms of trades that would have been profita-
ble if made instantaneously but which became unprofitable as a result of the waiting. 
(Damoradan 2010) 
 
Illiquidity is relevant to this study for several reasons. One of them being the notion, 
that illiquidity risk is systematic risk. In other words, the illiquidity increases when the 
market is down. This risk should be built into the discount rate and further the valuation 
and hence future returns. Empirical evidence exists of this phenomenon; assets that are 
less liquid have historically earned higher returns. (Damoradan 2010) 
 
Illiquidity can be caused by other factors too such as market forces and regulation. A 
recent example of Kesko’s acquisition of Suomen Lähikauppa Oy acts as evidence for 
such illiquidity; the asset could not have been sold to other market participants involved 
due to market share restrictions and private equity could not act as an acquirer due to 
scalability. The stock reaction for Kesko, the acquirer, at the announcement was over 
6% positive.  
2.4 Signaling 
Roll (1986) suggests that when the acquirer places a bid on a target it might suggest that 
the unannounced cash flows could be higher. Thus the combination of the new infor-
mation on earnings and an acquisition offset each other. Contrary withdrawing a bid 
might signal the opposite about the acquirer’s future outlook. Another perspective for 
signaling is the payment method. If the company is paying for the acquisition with cash 
it might signal that the acquirers stock is undervalued and on the contrary if the payment 
is financed with stock it might be a signal of overvaluation. (Myers & Majluf 1984) 
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This fact is intuitive since when a company finances a deal with the stock of its own, it 
forfeits some of the potential profit that would result from a successful deal i.e. a soar in 
its’ stock price. Also on the contrary if the company’s stock price were to slide, the tar-
get would absorb a portion of the loss in value. 
 
Grossman & Hart (1981) find that there are two types of signals from a miss valuated 
company. The first one asserts that the target company has resources that are managed 
inefficiently by the incumbent management and thus if a potential bidder has infor-
mation of such inefficiency it can allocate these resources more efficiently resulting in a 
higher valuation of the company. The other hypothesis suggests that the bidder discov-
ers information, not available for other traders, that the target is undervalued on the 
stock market relative to its actual performance. Consequently the bidder can utilize this 
information to acquire the target on a relatively small premium leaving value to be real-
ized for the other investors. 
2.5 Financing decision 
A deal can be financed with various payment methods such as equity linked derivatives, 
but in the limits of this thesis we consider three types. Cash offer, Stock offer and Hy-
brid financing. Cash offer consists of mainly cash (80%) stock offer consists mainly of 
stock (80%) and hybrid financing is a mixture of cash and stock (20%-80% cash). The 
means used to finance the deal is of great importance both for the acquirer and the tar-
get. Takeover regulation can be one reason, but beside it the reasons are abundant. A 
company’s financing decision of a M&A deal can be dependent on the following fac-
tors: 
 
 Accounting 
 Availability of financing 
 Tax considerations 
 Bidder’s liquidity 
 Bidder’s gearing 
 Risk management 
 Target’s will 
 
The accounting aspect derives from the accounting policy the bidder wants to employ to 
account for the acquisition. The availability of financing derives from the available debt 
and cash reserves of the bidder to make a cash offer. If the company has insufficient 
cash reserves or high gearing it might not be able to raise enough capital for a cash of-
fer. Liquidity of the bidder might also pose similar threats.  
 
The tax consideration is applicable when the bidder wants to structure the acquisition 
financing in a way that maximizes the tax reliefs and consequently increasing the value 
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of the acquisition. Depending on the jurisdiction the overall tax burden can be reduced 
by financing through subsidiaries, sheltering profits with deductible goodwill and asset 
write-offs, interest payment tax deductibility, carry-forward tax losses and multiple oth-
er reasons. All this must be made while maintaining a reasonable gearing ratio and cred-
it rating as well as liquidity. 
 
Risk management comes into consideration in the currency and valuation risk. A pure 
stock offer might signal that the bidder think itself as overvalued and by making a stock 
offer the target’s shareholders would have to bear some of this overvaluation risk. On 
the other hand if the bidder has a hard time valuing the target, offers cash and, post-
acquisition, skeletons appear from the target’s closet the bidder’s shareholders bear the 
entire loss. In a share exchange this risk is mitigated.  
 
Contrary if the bidder expects good times to come it might offer cash only since then the 
bidder’s shareholders could expect to gain extra value, assuming that the cash premium 
is adequate. The target’s shareholders have contradictory incentives and thus the will of 
the target’s shareholders is in a key role when considering financing. 
2.6 Challenges of mergers and acquisitions 
As already discussed managerial self-indulging, objectives such as empire building and 
diversification can be a source to a failure in a M&A transaction. However this type of 
deal entails several other challenges that need to be overcome before the acquisition can 
be declared successful. Sudarsanam (2003 p. 334) suggests that the mergers and acquisi-
tions should be regarded as processes rather than just transactions. This implies that 
continuous evaluation and development of M&A policies should be made in organiza-
tions. A categorization of pre-deal post-deal challenges is used, mainly because of sim-
plification. 
 
Pre-deal challenges 
 
Valuation 
 
Valuation and deal structuring is an essential part of the acquisition. The acquisition 
price has to be less than the expected value enhancements (e.g. cost efficiencies, reve-
nue enhancement, tax benefits etc.) resulting from the deal. Figure 2 presents a visuali-
zation of the importance of the valuation of the deal. 
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Figure 2. Value breakdown in acquisition. (After Sudarsanam, 2003) 
 
The column on the left side of figure 2 represents the pre-acquisition price plus the val-
ue added by the acquirer which represents 50 million Euros that derive from operating 
efficiencies, revenue enhancement and tax benefits. The center column represents the 
maximum premium the acquirer can pay for the target in order for the deal to create 
value. If the premium exceeds the respective amount of 45 million Euros the deal will 
rather destroy shareholder value than create it. The last column demonstrates a case 
where the acquirer would pay a premium of 35 million Euros and as a result it would 
gain 10 million Euros of value.  
 
The greatest challenge regarding the respective illustration is calculating the value that 
the acquirer can add after the deal. Damoradan (2005) asserts that most mergers and 
acquisitions fail to deliver any synergy benefits and that most acquirers overpay for 
their alleged synergies. He states that most common for the overpayment of synergies 
are, the already discussed, managerial hubris, bias in the estimation process and a failure 
to plan for synergies. He also states that the valuation process has some common errors 
that effect the overpayment: 
 
a) Subsidizing the target firm stockholders 
 
The acquirers often render into target firms premiums for assets that the target had no 
role in creating. An example of such subsidization is a situation where the acquirer has a 
high debt rating with a cost for debt of 3 % and the target has a much lower one with a 
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cost for debt of 6 %. When computing the cost of capital for the target firm the cost of 
debt is calculated with the acquiring firms cost of debt with the argument that the acqui-
sition will be funded with new debt at a lower cost. The lower cost of capital will result 
into a higher valuation of the target firm and hence the acquirer will subsidize the tar-
gets shareholders albeit they do not play a role in the higher rating. 
 
b) Wrong discount rate 
 
The calculation of the cash flows of the future synergies are discounted with a discount 
rate. A common mistake in choosing the discount rate is to choose either the discount 
rate for the target or the acquirer instead of the discount rate for the combined firm. An-
other mistake is to count “sure” cash flows such as tax benefits with the riskless rate 
since synergies are never riskless.  
 
c) Value of control 
 
The value of control derives from the assumption that the acquirer can manage the tar-
get in a more efficient way than the current management. Often when valuing a compa-
ny the value of control is calculated as a part of the synergies and thus it will result in 
confusion and overlapping i.e. some parts of value might be calculated twice. 
 
Defense against takeovers 
 
When attempting a takeover via tender offer the acquirer might face challenges in per-
suading the target stockholders to tender their shares. This can be a result of either the 
reluctance of the management against the bid or a competing bidder in which case the 
tender offer can result in a corporate takeover battle. Resisting a bid can be premised on 
the belief that remaining independent serves the interests of the target shareholders, the 
attempt to extract a maximum premium from the bidder or the fear of losing their posi-
tion. (Sudarsanam 2003 p. 506-507) 
 
Takeover defense strategies can be categorized in pre-bid defense strategies and post-
bid defense strategies. Pre-bid defense strategies are pre-emptive actions which help the 
company to anticipate unwanted bids. Consequently post-bid strategies are implemented 
after the bid is placed. Table 3 illustrates the various pre-bid strategies. 
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Table 3. Pre-bid defensive strategies.(After Sudarsanam 2003, p. 508) 
 
 
Some of the actions represented in table 3 are regulated by Goverments for example the 
UK Companies Act 1985 states that the true owners behind the purchase must be able to 
be tracked. On the contrary some actions are not available for other countries. Johans-
son and Torstensson (2008) find that in the Swedish market the most frequent defense 
strategy is to attack the logic of the bid. Also corporate restructurings are known to be 
used to increase the bid. 
 
Post-offer defense strategies differ from pre-bid defense strategies since when a bid is 
placed the time is of the essence for the targets management. Sudarsanam (1991) pre-
sents a comprehensive list of post-offer defense strategies used in the UK presented in 
table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Result
Internal Defenses
Operational efficiency
Higher EPS resulting into higher share 
price
Strategic focus: divestments, 
demerger, carve-outs, etc
Improved EPS
Asset stripping by bidder diffcult
Firms capital structure: Several share 
classes, high gearing, share buyback
Control by bidder difficult
High gearing makes LBO's difficult
Management structure, golden 
parachute
Predator control delayed and bid cost 
increased
Cultivate unions and workforce
Form alliances against bidder, share 
support from pension funds etc.
External defenses
Influence shareholders through 
investor relations: advise about 
performance and future outlooks
Ensures loyalty and support of key 
shareholders
Influence analysts: inform about 
strategy and future outlooks
Share undervaluation risk mitigated 
and bid cost raised
Embrace social responsibility to 
improve social image
Public hostility against 
predator/bidder
Strategic defense investments e.g. 
joint ventures and mutual 
shareholding
Predator control blocked
Monitor the share register for unusual 
share purchases
Early warning about possible 
predators
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Table 4. Post-bid defense strategies. (After Sudarsanam 1991) 
 
 
Sudarsanam (1994) finds that during 1983-1989 from sample of 238 UK companies 147 
successfully defended themselves. Cross-shareholding, shareholder agreements giving 
first refusal right, board changes made difficult by acquirer and restrictions in disin-
vestments in subsidiaries or sale of assets characterize Sweden’s pre-bid strategies. 
Post-offer strategies include frustrating actions subject to approval by shareholder meet-
ing (Sudarsanam 2003, p. 520). However Burkart & Panunzi’s (2006) literature review 
suggests that there is no evidence of the effects of takeover defense impact on share-
holder wealth. 
 
The costs of different defense strategies vary, but Johansson and Torstensson (2008) 
conclude that the most cost-efficient defense strategy is attacking the logic of the bid 
and giving positive information. Additionally such defense strategies do not influence 
other strategies that might be needed to be implemented to defend against the takeover. 
Costly strategies, which are scarcely used in Sweden are the Crown Jewel and scorching 
Defense Purpose
First response and pre-emption lett
Attack bid logic and price; advise target 
shareholders not to accpets the bid
Defence document
Praise own performance and future 
outlooks, ridicule bid price and logic, bid 
financing and bidder track record
Profit report
Report improved profits to make the offer 
look cheap
Promise higher dividends
Increase shareholder returns and make 
predators promise of returns look bad
Asset revaluation
Revalue intangibles an dother assets, 
show that the bid undervalues the target
Share support campaign
Enlist own employee pension fund to 
attempt to block control
Regulatory appeal Lobby regulators to block the bid
Litigation
To enforce antitrust rules or force 
disclousure of nominee shareholders
Acquisition and divestments
Buy a business to make the target bigger 
or incompatible with bidder, sell "crown 
jewels", Management buyout, bidder 
strategy made obsolete
Unions/workforce
Show that relations with them will be 
compromised if the bid is accepted
Red herring Attack predator on peripheral matter
Advertisement Media campaign to discredit bid
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earth in which the company divests it’s most valuable or other key assets to make the 
Targtr unattractive for the bidder. 
 
Post-deal challenges 
 
After the deal is closed two separate entities must be integrated or if the acquirer is a 
private equity player the strategic adjustments that were planned must be implemented. 
Haspelagh & Jemison (1991) present a matrix of the tradeoff between strategic interde-
pendence and need for autonomy for the acquired company. The integration matrix is 
provided in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Integration approaches.(After Ellis and Lamont, 2004) 
 
The mix of autonomy and strategic interdependence leads to four types of post-
acquisition integration types: portfolio management, preservation symbiosis and absorp-
tion. A successful integration requires identifying characteristics of both parties and 
applying the corresponding integration approach. 
 
Haspelagh & Jemison (1991) find three possible reasons for integration problems: value 
destruction, determinism and leadership vacuum. Determinism can be described as 
holding on to the pre-acquisition plan no matter what, which leads into unrealistic inte-
gration plans. This sparks hostility against the managers which can erupt in a non-
cooperative environment that harms the transition process. Value destruction may ap-
pear in a situation where the integration experience of managers on both sides is not 
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aligned with their expectations and they stand to lose in the process. Thus the acquisi-
tion is erodes value at a personal level. If the managers believe the acquisition is value 
destroying on a personal level, distrust and cooperation may become an obstacle. Lastly 
the commitment of top management from the acquirer side might constitute to a prob-
lem of confusion hence the top management involvement is important.  
 
Other integration problems might stem from the infrastructure of the company. Such 
infrastructure can be intangible, such as culture or tangible like information technology 
systems. Prior to acquisition capabilities to integrate such infrastructure should be ex-
amined especially relating to culture of the company, since it is a challenging area to 
control. 
2.7 Market efficiency 
Eugene Fama (1970) introduced the hypothesis of efficient markets. The hypothesis 
elaborates the connection between information and stock prices i.e. how the information 
about the underlying stock is incorporated in the price of the respective stock. The effi-
cient market hypothesis can be broken down into three categories: 
 
 Weak form efficiency 
 Semi-strong form efficiency 
 Strong form efficiency 
 
The weak form efficiency states that prices of traded assets reflect all past publicly 
available information. This implies that prices of assets cannot be predicted by analyz-
ing prices from the past. In semi-strong form efficiency it is implied that additionally to 
the conditions that apply in weak form efficiency, publicly available new information is 
reflected in the asset prices rapidly. This entails that trading on the new information will 
not yield excess returns. The last form of efficiency, the strong form, asserts that assets 
prices comprises all information, public and private and hence there is no excess returns 
to be made by no one. Legal restrictions, such as insider trading laws, make the strong 
form efficiency obsolete, unless in a case where laws are universally disregarded.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis is covered because the event study methodology heavi-
ly relies on the premise that the respective hypothesis works. The hypothesis establishes 
the connection between stock prices and information that is essential when conducting 
an event study. If the efficient market hypothesis is valid the study will show abnormal 
returns immediately after the announcement of a merger or and acquisition. In case of 
zero abnormal returns the efficient market hypothesis is not valid or the announcement 
has no impact on shareholder value. 
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2.8 Information asymmetry 
Asymmetric information is a phenomenon related to market efficiency. Harris (2002, p. 
14) describes the respective term as a situation in which some of the traders in the mar-
ket hold more or better information than others. Gajewski (1999) introduces a hypothe-
sis that some traders have better capabilities to interpret information and thus have an 
edge over other traders while creating information asymmetry in the market. In transac-
tions, such as M&A deals, information asymmetry creates an imbalance which can lead 
into problems like adverse selection and moral hazard (Wilson 2008, Ledyard 2008). 
 
Adverse selection can be described as a situation in which the ignorant party lacks in-
formation while negotiating an agreed contract. Akerlof (1970) uses insurance as exam-
ple of adverse selection; a person who is high risk is more likely to buy insurance since 
the insurance firms cannot effectively separate the risky persons from the less risky. In 
the context of mergers and acquisitions an example of adverse selection could be a situ-
ation where the selling company has some information that the acquirer does not pos-
sess and hence might overpay for the target, creating superior abnormal returns for the 
targets shareholders and destroy value of its’ own shareholders. These kinds of risks are 
often mitigated by paying part of the consideration with stock. Unsolicited tender offers 
face a serious threat in the respective situation since they are executed under limited 
information on the target. 
 
Moral hazard on the other hand relates to activities after the agreement such as the pos-
sibility to monitor performance or not being able to influence the problem. Such prob-
lems in an M&A transaction could arise in the already discussed management personal 
motives or in the post-acquisition integration in respect of the motivation of the em-
ployees.  
 
 28 
3 CHARASTERISTICS OF THE NORDIC M&A 
MARKET 
This chapter covers the characteristics of the Nordic mergers and acquisitions market. 
Market size, deal flow trend, active sectors and other factors that might affect the results 
of the event study are described. The Nordic mergers and acquisitions market is highly 
integrated and the sample’s 87 cross-border acquisitions reinforce such notion. 
3.1 Nordic M&A market general characteristics 
According to Roschier (2013) the Nordic M&A market is a mature market, offering 
sophisticated market practices and deal documentation which promotes high deal activi-
ty. They also argue that the various countries in the Nordic market are well integrated 
since the legislative tradition is quite similar in the different countries, especially in Fin-
land and Sweden. A good integration enables a steady flow of cross-border acquisitions 
that add up to the total value of the deals.  
 
The financing of M&A transactions also plays a big role in deal activity and hence the 
healthy financial sector and willingness to finance transactions constitutes to the execu-
tion of M&A deals. Additionally Nordic large listed corporations that have been active 
players in the market tend to have healthy balance sheets. (Roschier 2013)  
 
Nordic countries tend to yield a lower premium than other European countries, which 
could be a result of the tendency for friendly deals (Moschier & Campa 2009). Gross-
man and Hart (1980) explain that friendly deals yield lower premiums on average com-
pared to hostile deals. 
 
3.2 Market size and deal flow 
The Nordic M&A market totaled 41.3 billion Euros in 2013, which represented an 8.1 
percent increase form 2012. (MergerMarket 2014) When subtracting the share of deal 
value in Norway the total market size comes up to a total of 29.1 billion Euros. From 
the remaining value Finland represented the largest share in 2013 followed by Sweden 
and Denmark in the respective order. However, 2013 cannot be considered a good 
proxy for the relative portion of deal value by country because the normal trend is that 
Sweden represents the majority of the deal value followed by Finland and Denmark in a 
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changing order. Figure 4. presents the M&A deal value broken down by country from 
2007 to 2013. 
 
 
Figure 4. Nordic Merger and Acquisition Market: Country Breakdown.(MergerMarket 
2014) 
 
Finland’s dominant position in 2013 can be mostly contributed to the sales Nokia’s De-
vices and Services Business Division which accounted for 5.4 billion euros and For-
tum’s 2.6 billion Euro deal concerning the sale of its’ electricity distribution companies. 
 
The Nordic’s contribution to Europe’s M&A is relatively small, fluctuating between 4 
and 10 percent, which is consistent with the relative market capitalization of the compa-
nies in the OMX Nordic compared to aggregate value of stock indices in the European 
Union. (MergerMarket 2014, Nasdaq OMX Nordic 2014, IndexMundi 2014) 
 
As earlier stated M&A deals tend to fluctuate cyclically and time period between 2007 
and 2013 seems to follow the proven pattern. When comparing figures 4 and 5, one can 
detect the same fluctuation in M&A deals as the OMX Nordic 40 index, but with a short 
delay.  
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Figure 5. OMXH Nordic 40 from 2005 to 2016. (Nasdaq OMX Nordic, 2016) 
 
The crash of late 2008 and early 2009 is present in the value of M&A deals in 2009 as 
well as the decline in 2011. We can derive in a result that the studied period in this the-
sis (2005-2010) incorporates a bull market from 2005 to 2007 as well as a bear market 
from 2007 to 2010. The fact that both bull and bear markets are included in the time 
period eliminates the biased view of either a growing or a declining market.  
 
Gaughan (2007) argues that M&A activity is fostered by the presence of Private Equity 
firms and that the boom in European M&A activity was fueled by hedge funds and pri-
vate equity firms. Figure 6 shows the Nordic private equity activity between years 2007-
2013. 
 
Figure 6 presents a similar trend for the private equity deals as M&A deals al together 
but with an even higher volatility in the value of deals. This may be a result of a higher 
sensitivity of funds and private equity firms to bear market conditions as well as availa-
ble funding. 
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Figure 6. Nordic Private Equity Deals (MergerMarket 2014) 
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4 HYPOTHESES 
The stock market reaction after a merger and acquisition announcement is defined by 
the consensus opinion of market participants and their expectation of the company’s 
ability to generate returns after the acquisition, i.e. how the decision to pursue the con-
cerning acquisition will affect the firm’s future cash flow and hence value. A positive 
reaction denotes that the participants expect the firm to perform better after the acquisi-
tion, whereas a negative reaction signals that investors anticipate the firm’s cash flows 
to be value destroying, i.e. smaller cash flows compared to if the acquisition would not 
have happened. 
 
As discussed in previous chapters motivations for acquisition can vary from managerial 
hubris that usually is value destroying to strategical acquisitions that improve the com-
pany’s market position, such as acquiring a competitor to gain pricing power. Previous 
studies results are dispersed to both negative and positive reactions, which combined 
with the arguments on the motivations of acquisitions, would suggest that the total ac-
quirer returns be close to zero. Given the previous literature and varying rationale to 
conduct acquisitions the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: “Acquisitions create positive or close to zero returns on an ag-
gregate level for the sample.” 
 
Consideration type used to finance acquisition is a widely studied area, and the results 
of previous studies have somewhat controversial outcomes. For example Eckbo et al. 
(1990, 2000) suggests that bidder gains are greatest when executing acquisitions with 
stock deal or a deal with combination of stock and cash. Theories supporting greater 
returns from stock or hybrid deal rely on arguments about reduced risk of overpaying 
since some of the valuation risk is borne by the target and financial slack theories; if a 
firm has excess cash for acquisition it might execute a more aggressive merger and ac-
quisition strategy and the management has the possibility to take on to empire building. 
Hansen, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Eckbo et al., 1990 have studied information asymmetry’s 
role in the choice of financing an acquisition. And explain stock deals’ larger returns 
with tax benefits and information asymmetries as well as with a bigger premium in cash 
deals because of the “tax penalty”.  
 
Another view provided by Travlos (1987) and Moeller et al. (2004) present evidence 
that bidder returns are higher in cash offers compared to a hybrid financing or an all-
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stock deal. Greater returns for cash deals are often argued with signaling and smaller 
risk of overpaying. Indeed Eckbo (1990) states that mergers which are financed with 
cash, do not have the signaling effect, because the value of the target is easily visible 
and the acquirer does not have as big of a risk in overpaying due to transparency. Con-
sequently overpaying is seen as an issue in both stock and cash deals. Delcoure and 
Hunsader (2006) find evidence that in cash deals’ the most important determinant is the 
target industry. Bruner (2004) study suggests a similar pattern by observing the consoli-
dations on different decades. Given the arguments stated by an abundance of research 
and argumentation we conclude our second hypothesis is a follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: “Acquisitions that are financed with cash yield greater returns 
than do those that are financed with stock on a SCAR basis. The market reaction 
for acquisitions financed with both cash and stock are expected to have greater 
returns than those financed solely with stock. Consequently all stock financed 
acquisitions are expected to generate the least returns.” 
 
The second hypothesis stands on the notion that transparency and confidence are valued 
by investors more than benefits from stock finance acquisitions. Cash deals provide 
transparency in valuation of the target and signal confidence in the acquisition. Even 
though the results from previous studies are dispersed, more studies suggest that cash 
deals generate greater returns. 
 
Cross-border acquisitions have become more common due to globalization and hence 
existing studies from different decades might yield varying results. Also the rationale 
for cross-border M&A is often different. The hypothesis is that cross-border acquisi-
tions bear more risk and hence should also have higher returns when successful. How-
ever, at present the risks have been mitigated by globalization and common trade areas 
and jurisdictions. As a result the assumption is that cross-border acquisitions used to 
generate larger returns in the past that they do nowadays. Danbolt (1966) finds that tar-
get company’s shareholders gain 6 to 11 percentage points more compared to domestic 
M&A deals. Harris and Ravencraft (1991) argue that the abnormal returns of cross-
border mergers and domestic ones do not have significant difference in returns. The two 
studies are conducted almost 30 years apart and reassert our hypothesis. Georgen and 
Renneboog (2004) find that in Europe cross-border mergers yield a 9% return for the 
target’s shareholders, but only 0.7% for the bidders, which is not much greater than 
general studies of abnormal returns. Kang (1993) suggests that cross-border acquisitions 
are expected to generate more wealth than domestic acquisitions due to the fact that 
multinational firms tend to have competitive advantage over local ones. The discussion 
leads us to the hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3: “Cross-border acquisitions yield higher SCAR than acquisitions 
in which both the acquirer and the target are based in the same country” 
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Hypothesis 3 is based on the greater risk that cross-border acquisitions bear and the 
competitive edge that multinational firms have over local ones. We also expect to see 
more variance in cross-border acquisition returns due to the very same reasoning of 
higher risk. 
 
Valuation theory suggests that the liquidity of an asset has effect on its underlying val-
ue, i.e. an asset that bears costs or inconvenience in the selling process (illiquid asset) 
reduces the assets value. In the context of this study the comparison would be between a 
publicly listed company and a private entity. Fuller et al. (2002) find that the bidder has 
positive returns when buying a private firm but destroys value when acquiring a public 
one. They argue that illiquidity of private companies is one of the reasons for a discount 
and hence the cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirer in private firm acquisitions 
are correlated positively with the size of the target. Similar results are found by Chang 
(1998) who finds that when private firms are acquired with cash significant positive 
returns are expected. When the consideration is paid with stock the returns are lower, 
but positive. Hansen and Lott (1996) find a similar pattern with Fuller (2000) in which 
when the bidder is acquiring a private firm bidders experience 2 % higher returns than 
when acquiring a public one. Consequently we arrive at the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: “Acquisitions of private firms yield greater returns than those that 
involve acquiring a publicly listed company for the acquirer. Furthermore we 
expect that an acquisition of any other type of illiquid asset creates greater re-
turns in comparison to more liquid assets.” 
 
The final hypothesis, hypothesis 5, is based on the differentiation of offer type to acqui-
sition and tender offer. Existing literature suggests that tender offers usually entail high-
er premium compared to acquisition due to the nature of tender offer. Unsolicited bids 
might require higer premium in order to be successful and since acquirer might act un-
der less information than in solicited bids the valuation is more uncertain. Under the 
aforementioned premises we conclude our final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: “Tender offers yield lower returns compared to acquisitions or 
other transactions that are solicited by the executive board.” 
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5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the data used for the analysis and introduces the reader to the 
methodology that is applied in the study. First it covers the description and characteris-
tics of the data sample and thereafter introduces the event study methodology. Under the 
event study analysis chapter normal performance, abnormal returns and the null hypoth-
esis are discussed. 
5.1 Data description 
The data used in this study comprises of 80 companies from NASDAQ OMX Nordic. 
The total count of transactions is 196 of which 144 are studied. 57 of the transactions 
were national i.e. transactions in which both the target and the acquirer are headquar-
tered in the same country. Cross-border transaction count was 87 with targets from the 
Nordics, Europe, Asia and Americas. List of all stocks included in this respective study 
can be found in appendix 1. All the stocks that were included were a part of the respec-
tive indices in the time period between 2006 and 2010. The data sample was limited 
with to satisfy the following criteria: 
 
 Stock liquidity 
 The acquired company has business operations, i.e. not purely an asset 
 The acquiree company is publicly listed in Copenhagen, Helsinki or Stockholm 
stock exchange 
 Percentage of the shares after the deal is over 50% 
 
Stock liquidity is defined by the trading volume of the respective stock. The require-
ment for the majority ownership after the deal is set to limit the transaction to the ones 
that have effect on the control of the target company. The requirement for the majority 
ownership after the deal is set to limit the transaction to the ones that have effect on the 
control of the target company.  
 
The filtered sample consists of 144 transaction announcements of which some are offers 
and the rest completed deals. In case of tender offer it is necessary to observe the ab-
normal returns as at the offer date since the stock market reacts to offers rather than 
closings of deals. For some deals abnormal returns have been calculated as at the an-
nouncement date since the market usually reacts to the announcement rather than the 
closing of a deal. It is important to understand the two categories in order to capture the 
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true abnormal returns. The reason for this is that usually investors react to announce-
ments if they see that the deal will occur with certainty, consequently announcements of 
completion of deals are usually anticipated and hence not reflected in the stock price. 
However some deals are announced only at closing and consequently the returns are 
calculated at closing. The distribution between closed and announced deals in the sam-
ple is presented in table 5 
 
 
Table 5. Sample distribution of closed deals and offers. 
      2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Total 
          Complete C 
 
1 45 28 18 12 
 
104 
Offer O 
 
4 21 8 7 0 
 
40 
Total     5 66 36 25 12 
 
144 
 
 
We also study the returns in cross-border deals versus ones that are not. The data con-
sists of 87 deals in which the acquirer and target are located in different countries and 
57 deals in which the acquirer and the target are in incorporated in the same country as 
depicted in table 6. The evenly distributed number of deals in each category ensures that 
the returns are most likely meaningful. 
 
 
Table 6. Sample distribution between cross-border and national deals. 
      2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Total 
          Cross-border 1 
 
4 38 24 14 7 
 
87 
National 0 
 
1 28 12 11 5 
 
57 
Total     5 66 36 25 12 
 
144 
 
 
The distribution of deals in the sample by consideration type is presented in table 7. 
Most of the deals in the sample had cash as consideration, which is in line with the hy-
pothesis; cash deals are perceived more typical than stock or hybrid deals. Additionally 
a large amount of deals do not include consideration details. 
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Table 7. Sample distribution according to consideration type. 
      2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Total 
          Cash C 
 
3 23 18 12 5 
 
61 
Stock S 
 
1 7 1 3 0 
 
12 
Hybrid H 
 
0 7 3 1 2 
 
13 
NA N 
 
1 29 14 9 5 
 
58 
Total     5 66 36 25 12 
 
144 
 
 
The sample is divided according to target characteristic into transaction with private and 
publicly listed targets. This is done in order to capture the hypothesis, that private com-
panies are assumed to include an illiquidity discount, which is discussed in chapter 
2.4.1. The sample seems to be distributed so that private companies have been the target 
in majority of the deals, but public company acquisitions are also abundant making the 
examination viable. 
 
 
Table 8. Sample distribution between private and publicly listed companies targets. 
      2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Total 
          Private 1 
 
2 46 20 13 11 
 
92 
Public 0 
 
3 20 16 12 1 
 
52 
Total     5 66 36 25 12 
 
144 
 
Tables 9, 10 and 11 illustrate the data according to industry category, country of incor-
poration and by company, respectively. Most of the transactions involve technology or 
industrial companies as anticipated. Majority of the sample transaction involve a com-
pany from the Helsinki stock exchange, in which industrial or technology companies 
accounted for almost half of the total count during the examined time period. 
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Table 9. Sample distribution according to industry category. 
      2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Total 
          Consumer Goods 
  
1 4 3 0 2 
 
10 
Industrials 
  
1 16 14 4 4 
 
39 
Financials 
  
0 15 3 4 1 
 
23 
Telecommunications 
  
0 0 1 1 0 
 
2 
Utilities 
  
0 0 1 0 0 
 
1 
Consumer Services 
  
0 8 1 4 2 
 
15 
Basic Materials 
  
0 4 0 2 0 
 
6 
Oil & Gas 
  
0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
Technology 
  
2 16 12 8 2 
 
40 
Health Care 
  
1 3 1 2 1 
 
8 
Total     5 66 36 25 12 
 
144 
 
 
 
Table 10. Sample distribution according to country of incorporation. 
      2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Total 
          Finland FI 
 
1 45 25 14 11 
 
96 
Sweden SE 
 
3 19 7 9 0 
 
38 
Denmark DK 
 
1 2 4 2 1 
 
10 
Total     5 66 36 25 12 
 
144 
 
 
Table 11. Sample distribution by company. 
      2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Total 
          Panostaja Oyj 
  
0 4 1 1 1 
 
7 
Kinnevik A 
  
0 1 1 3 0 
 
5 
Aldata Solutions 
  
0 1 2 0 1 
 
4 
Ericsson A 
  
0 2 0 2 0 
 
4 
ICA Gruppen 
  
0 2 0 2 0 
 
4 
Other 
  
5 56 32 17 10 
 
120 
Total     5 66 36 25 12 
 
144 
 
The companies that are included in the study can be found in table 12. Some of the 
companies where delisted during the time window of the study and they are presented in 
appendix 3. 
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Table 12. Sample distribution by company. 
      
   Panostaja Oyj 
 
Oriola-KD A 
Kinnevik A 
 
Rapala VMC 
Aldata Solutions 
 
Sanoma Oyj 
Ericsson A 
 
Pöyry Oyj 
ICA Gruppen 
 
Raisio 
Atria Oyj A 
 
Readsoft 
LBI international 
 
TeliaSonera 
Metso Oyj 
 
Alma Media Oyj 
Wulff-Yhtiöt Oyj 
 
F-Secure Oyj 
Basware Oyj 
 
Tryg 
Teleste Oyj 
 
Lundbeck 
Lindab International 
 
Terveystalo 
Revenio Group Oyj 
 
Vaisala Oyj A 
Julius Tallberg kiinteistöt 
 
Biotie Therapies Oyj 
Transcom worldwide 
 
Olvi Oyj A 
Turvatiimi 
 
Affecto Oyj 
Takoma Oyj 
 
A.P. Møller - Mærsk A 
G4S plc 
 
Millicom Int. Cellular SDB 
Outotec Oyj 
 
Tieto Oyj 
Afarak Group 
 
Fortum Oyj 
Soprano Oyj 
 
Vacon 
Rocla 
 
Dovre Group 
Evia Oyj 
 
Stockmann Oyj Abp B 
Topsil Semiconductor Materials 
 
Trainers´ House Oyj 
Aspo Oyj 
 
Technopolis Oyj 
Pohjola Pankki 
 
Kaupthing 
Rejlers 
 
Citycon Oyj 
Bure Equity 
 
A-Com 
Perlos 
 
KappAhl 
Kemira Oyj 
 
Keops 
Ixonos Oyj 
 
TradeDoubler 
Securitas B 
 
Etteplan Oyj 
Bittium Oyj 
 
Glaston Oyj Abp 
Fiskars Oyj Abp 
 
Codan 
Ahlstrom Oyj 
 
Invik Co 
Oral hammaslääkärit 
 
Componenta Oyj 
Kesla A 
 
Nokia Oyj 
EVOX Rifa 
 
AstraZeneca 
Lemminkäinen Oyj 
 
FLSmidth & Co. 
SSH Communications Security 
 
United Int. Enterprises 
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5.2 Data gathering and variables 
The stock data was gathered from database containing the stock data for all relevant 
stocks in the underlying indices. Splits of each stocks are also determined for compara-
bility. During years 2005-2010 16 splits occurred in the relevant sample of which 7 
were some sort of stock split, 8 were either stock issues and one de-merger. The news 
data was scraped from the website of NASDAQ OMX Nordic and manually sorted in 
pre-determined categories described in the control variable section. 
5.2.1 Variables 
The respective study has one independent variable, which is a corporate announcement 
on an acquisition or a tender offer. The selection has been restricted to corporate an-
nouncements opposed to both corporate announcements and media news, since the ex-
ternal media should not attain acquisition or tender offer information before the compa-
ny has released a corporate announcement on such event. However it must be noted that 
in many cases rumors on prospective acquisitions and tender offers exist in the market 
and might affect the stock price before the actual event time, T=0.  
5.2.2 Control variables 
Based on previous studies and assessed key parameters affecting a deal the following 
control variables were chosen: 
 
 Nationalities of the deal participants: Was the deal a cross-border deal? 
 Financing: Was the deal financed with stock, cash or both? 
 Target characteristic: Was the target a public or a private company? 
 Deal type: Was the deal a tender offer or an acquisition? 
 
The data sample is also bound by language since only announcements in Finnish and 
English were used. Thus if a company reports only in Swedish or Danish, the respective 
transaction was not incorporated in the studied data.  
5.3 Event study analysis 
Event study analysis relies on a premise, that when measuring an impact of an economic 
event (in this study M&A transaction), one can observe the fluctuation in asset prices 
after the announcement of such event. In other words, conducting an event study com-
prises of observing the share prices around the transaction/event and measuring the 
change in share prices. The usefulness of such method is based on the assumption of 
efficient markets, i.e. the effect of such event is reflected immediately in asset prices.  
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According to existing literature (e.g. Andrade et al. 2001) the traditional short-window 
event study methodology is most reliable for estimating whether M&A transactions 
create or destroy shareholder value, when average abnormal returns are used as a proxy 
for value creation. Moreover, Andrade et al. (2001) and Tuch & O’Sullivan (2007) pro-
vide evidence of short-window event studies having less methodological problems 
compared to long-window event studies. 
 
A normal return is a return expected in a situation with no announcement, which can be 
considered as a default situation. The assumption for a default situation is the average of 
the returns from the estimation period. The data for the normal returns is extracted from 
a period prior to the transaction announcement date and it is usually referred to as the 
estimation window. The estimation window in the underlying thesis is 120 trading days 
(starting ending). The estimation window usually does not overlap with the event win-
dow to prevent the event from influencing the normal performance model parameter 
estimates.  
 
The event window is the chosen time period after the event announcement has been 
made. In this study the respective window is three days. A three day period was chosen 
because existing literature suggest that in order to capture the actual abnormal returns in 
all cases, the window must include deals that were announced after the market is closed. 
Additionally if the announcement date is misplaced by a day the three day event win-
dow will capture the returns. (MacKinlay, 1997)  
 
After computing the normal returns, they are compared with the returns observed within 
the event window. The percentage difference between the returns from the estimation 
and the event window will represent the abnormal returns on the underlying stock/asset. 
(MacKinlay, 1997) 
 
In order to conduct an event study the following assumptions must be taken into consid-
eration and assume that they hold:  
 
 Market efficiency 
 Information asymmetry 
 No simultaneous events 
 
Market efficiency includes the presumption that stock prices reflect all relevant infor-
mation that is available in the market. It also assumes that the effect of economic events 
is reflected in the price in a relatively short period of time thus share prices should react 
only in case of an event such as a M&A announcement. Information asymmetry entails 
the nature of the information published i.e. it assumes that the information is unantici-
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pated and no investors have got an edge by receiving the information in advance. The 
third assumption relates to confounding events. The assumption states that no confound-
ing events must be imposed for the purpose of isolating the event of interest from other 
events that may occur simultaneously. Figure 7. illustrates the described event study 
process. 
 
 
T-120                   T-20     T-1       T0        T+1          T20                                Ti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimation window     Event windows                   Post-event 
 
Figure 7. The structure of event study methodology.  
 
The event study process has multiple steps which are conducted in a pre-determined 
order. First the event of interest is identified and the period over which share prices of 
the companies being included in the study will be examined. The next step includes 
determining the selection criteria for the inclusion of a firm in the study. In this phase it 
must be studied whether all the companies in the study are valid under pre-determined 
conditions. After this normal returns will be calculated for the sample in the frame of 
the estimation window to observe the normal return of an asset. Finally the abnormal 
returns are calculated in the frame of the event window and cumulative abnormal re-
turns will be statistically observed to get validity and insight on the results. 
 
Choosing the estimation and the event window 
 
The estimation and event window were selected using previous literature (e.g. MacKin-
lay 1997) as a basis. The estimation window was set to 120 days prior to the event. As-
suming that there are approximately 22 trading days per month the normal performance 
is measured over 5.5 months approximately. This should be a timespan enough to cap-
ture the actual normal performance. The estimation window does not overlap with the 
event window so that the event under study does not affect the normal returns. 
 
Event windows used in previous short window studies are usually three days long [-1, 
1]. This thesis applies the same event window length since it has been proved to yield 
robust results. A three day window ensures that the event is taken into account even if 
the date in the data is misplaced by 1 day.  
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This thesis uses an intraday analysis with a sampling interval of 5 minutes. A sampling 
interval is the length of the return sampling interval, which determines the length be-
tween of two consecutive data points when modelling the returns. A 5 minute interval 
was chosen according to Reboredo et al. (2012) study that finds that a 5 minute interval 
ceded the best out-of-sample profitability for highly volatile periods. 
 
Normal performance measurement 
The approaches available for calculating normal performance are abundant, but they can 
be roughly grouped into two categories: statistical and economic. The statistical models 
rely on statistical assumption concerning the returns of an asset and do not depend on 
any economic arguments. Correspondingly the economic approach takes investors’ be-
havior and other subjective measurements into account. In addition to this economic 
models utilize statistical assumptions.  
 
The two most common choices for measuring the normal performance return: the con-
stant-mean-return model and the market model. The constant-mean-return model is per-
haps the simplest model and it assumes that an assets return over time is independent 
and normally distributed with constant mean and variant. In contrast the market model 
which relates the return of a stock to the return of the market portfolio. The market 
model is argued to detect abnormal returns more accurately, since it removes some of 
the returns incorporated in the market returns (Mackinlay 1997). 
 
This thesis uses a simple average of the estimation windows returns, seeing that the 
economic models do not provide substantially superior results compared to statistical 
models as Brown & Warner (1980, 1985) and Brown & Weinstein (1985)  and MacKin-
lay (1997) suggest.  
 
The normal performance is measured by regressing the stocks’ returns on the market 
returns over the estimation window. The estimators will be attained from the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) model. These parameters will provide us tools for estimating the 
normal returns. For any stock we get a formula 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,        (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 are the period-t returns on the security i and market portfolio, re-
spectively, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the estimators of the market model and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the zero mean 
disturbance term. 
 
NASDAQ OMXH Nordic equity indices are used for each country to approximate the 
market returns. The indices used in this study can be found in appendix 2 
 
Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns 
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An abnormal return is the difference in the normal return calculated in the estimation 
window and the return observed in the event window. This return is the unanticipated 
return that derives from the merger. Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns can be 
calculated with the following formula: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡,        (2) 
 
where 𝑎𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑖are the estimators calculated from the ordinary least regression (OLS) 
model. 
 
After calculating the abnormal returns, other aggregated results must be calculated over 
time and securities. Other returns calculated using abnormal returns as a basis are Cu-
mulative abnormal returns (CAR), Standardized abnormal returns (SAR) and Standard-
ized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR). CAR’s are calculated over the event window 
as cumulative results of the abnormal returns as the name implies. The standardized 
returns calculations are standardized in terms of standard deviation and in relation with 
the abnormal returns.  
 
The SAR is standardized with its standard deviation and is calculated with the following 
equation (Dodd & Warner 1983): 
 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡
,          (3) 
 
where 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 is standard deviation that can be calculated with the following equation: 
 
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = √
𝑆𝑖
2×(1+
1
𝑇(𝑅𝑚𝑡−𝑅𝑚)
2)
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑡−𝑅𝑚)2
𝑇
𝑡=1
 ,        (4) 
 
where 𝑆𝑖
2 is residual variance of firm 𝑖 from the market model and 𝑅𝑚 is the mean re-
turn in the market portfolio during the estimation period. The SAR can be used to calcu-
late CAR over the event window 𝑘 in the following way: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = √
1
𝑘
× ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡,
𝑘
𝑡=1         (5) 
 
from the calculation of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 we can derive finally at the Standardized cumulative ab-
normal return (SCAR): 
 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡
.         (6) 
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The null hypothesis can be tested using 𝐽2 which assumes that the distribution of ab-
normal returns follows normal distribution and can be calculated from SCAR with the 
equation: 
 
𝐽2 = (
𝑁(𝐿1−4)
𝐿1−2
)
1
2 × 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ~𝑁(0,1),       (7) 
 
where 𝑁 is the number of securities, 𝐿1is the length of the estimation window and 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  constitutes to the average over N securities. The 𝐽2 test was chosen because 
according to MacKinlay (1997) 𝐽2 gives more weight on the securities with lower vari-
ance, and hence gives more robust results. If the abnormal returns are not distributed 
normally 𝐽2 and 𝐽4 tests are used for they are non-parametric tests i.e. they do not as-
sume that returns are distributed in a specific manner. 
5.4 Cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns 
After the abnormal and standardized abnormal returns have been calculated for the 
whole sample, it is common to examine how firm specific factors influence the abnor-
mal returns. Theoretical models commonly suggest that characteristics specific to the 
event observation have an association between the magnitude of abnormal returns. 
Cross-sectional analysis is seen as an appropriate tool to analyse the association. How-
ever caution should be applied when interpreting the results of the cross-sectional re-
gression approach, because in many situations the abnormal return is related to firm 
characteristics through a relation between the firm characteristics and the extent to 
which the event is anticipated, additionally to the valuation effects of the event. 
(MacKinlay, 1997) 
 
The cross sectional analysis is constructed with standardized cumulative abnormal re-
turns defined as vector y, the dependent variable, and a matrix of characteristics of in-
terest as X. The first column of X is a vector of ones and each of the remaining columns 
is a vector consisting of the characteristics for each event observation. Following the 
previous definitions we get a regression equation 
 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝜃 +  𝜂          (8) 
 
Where 𝜃 is the coefficient vector and 𝜂 is the disturbance vector. Assuming the normal 
returns to be 0 we can consistently estimate 𝜃 using OLS model. Additionally we as-
sume that the elements of 𝜂 are cross-sectionally uncorrelated and homoscedastic for the 
purpose of using the usual OLS standard error to derive the inferences. 
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The cross sectional analysis is done according to the underlying hypothesis i.e. consid-
eration details, nationality details and company type. The analysis is conducted includ-
ing only deals with the specific characteristics. 
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6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter the results of the underlying event study is discussed for the total sample 
of 144 announcements as well as according to the defined control variables. The total 
examined count of transaction was narrowed to 125 in order to account for only transac-
tions including the acquirers’ returns. The results are reflected against the outlined hy-
pothesis and furthermore discussed by benchmarking the results to existing literature on 
the respective subject. The main objective of the study is not to examine the total sam-
ple returns, but rather perceive the returns related to hypothesis 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
6.1 Total sample returns 
The core of the event study was to examine whether the acquisition announcement initi-
ate a stock reaction. The thesis uses SCAR analysis, which assumes that abnormal re-
turns for all stocks are standardized using their individual variances as calculated in the 
estimation window. It can be argued that the standardized returns provide more robust 
results opposed to non-standardized returns, since non-standardized abnormal returns 
assume that the variance for all stocks in the sample is equal. This in turn is not realistic, 
especially because the sample acquisitions took place over a 5 year time window.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Standardized cumulative abnormal returns for the total sample. 
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The total sample shows standardized cumulative abnormal returns of 0.21% on an ag-
gregate level. Figure 8 illustrates the SCAR pattern from which it can be observed that 
at T0 the abnormal returns spike positively to 0.35% on the first day of trading and 
thereafter have a slight declining trend towards the x-axis. Our first hypothesis suggests 
that the abnormal returns of the total sample are positive or close to zero, and as it can 
be observed from figure 8, our results support the underlying hypothesis. 
 
When testing the standardized cumulative abnormal returns against the null hypothesis a 
clear reaction at T0 can be seen. In statistical terms the aggregate reaction reaches statis-
tical significance, showing that the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis is above 
the 99% threshold. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. J2 test for the total sample. 
 
J2 test assumes that the distribution of abnormal returns follow normal distribution and 
if the returns are not distributed normally J3 and J4 tests should be used for they are non-
parametric tests. Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of the samples abnormal returns. 
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the J2 test. 
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Figure 10. Distribution of the sample returns 
6.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
Cross-sectional analysis extends the observation of standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns to individual transaction specific variables. The hypothesis for the respective 
variables is presented in chapter 4. Table 13 illustrates the cross-sectional regression of 
pre-defined variables. The table presents estimated regression coefficients and the p-
value that examines whether the variable accepts or rejects the null hypothesis. Statisti-
cally significant values are presented with one, two or three asterisks for statistical sig-
nificance of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.  
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Table 13. Multiple regression analysis output 
  1 2 3 4 
     Intercept 0.123 0.070 0.026 -0.022 
     Consideration: cash 
    Regression co-efficient 0.069 
  
0.135 
p-value 0.742 
  
0.546 
     Consideration: stock 
    Regression co-efficient 
 
-0.272 
 
-0.122 
p-value 
 
0.415 
 
0.731 
     Consideration: hybrid 
    Regression co-efficient 
  
0.599 0.628 
p-value 
  
0.0626** 0.0639** 
     Deal type: cross-border 
    Regression co-efficient -0.336 -0.369 -0.295 -0.328 
p-value 0.081** 0.061** 0.117 0.097* 
     Target type: private Co 
    Regression co-efficient 0.373 0.381 0.285 0.322 
p-value 0.254 0.240 0.374 0.324 
     Offer type: tender offer 
    Regression co-efficient 0.489 0.550 0.478 0.470 
p-value 0.195 0.147 0.198 0.220 
          
     R-squared 0.200 0.211 0.258 0.268 
Observations 125 125 125 125 
 
 
From the first equation of table 13 we can interpret the slightest positive relationship 
between cash as consideration and standardized cumulative abnormal returns. However 
the p-value of 0.742 suggests that the null hypothesis is not rejected and moreover the 
value is not statistically significant, thus suggesting that the standardized abnormal re-
turns are not significantly affected when using cash as consideration. The second equa-
tion is related to consideration detail as well. It examines the abnormal returns in trans-
actions where stock was used as consideration. The equation finds a negative correlation 
between abnormal returns and stock payment, but yet again the p-value is high at 0.415 
and the result is not statistically significant. The third equation presents the relationship 
between hybrid financing, a combination of cash and stock as consideration, and stand-
ardized abnormal returns. The equation suggests that hybrid financing and abnormal 
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returns have a positive correlation with a regression co-efficient of 0.599. The probabil-
ity of rejecting the null hypothesis is rather low at 6% and the value is statistically sig-
nificant. The fourth equation examines the effect of cross-border transactions to abnor-
mal returns and finds that transactions that involve parties from several countries create 
lesser returns opposed to transactions with both parties headquartered in the same coun-
try. The null hypothesis is rejected at a p-value threshold of 10% and the values appear 
statistically significant. The fifth and sixth equations study the effect of company and 
deal type to returns. The fifth equation implies that when acquiring a private company 
opposed to a stock listed entity the returns are greater. Equation six examines whether 
tender offers create larger returns compared to acquisitions. Both premises find a posi-
tive correlation however neither one is statistically significant. The R-squared value 
fluctuates in the range of 0.20 to 0.27, which can be considered sufficient for an econo-
metric model to be meaningful. 
6.3 Summary of results and discussion 
The findings in the underlying thesis are supported as well as rejected by existing litera-
ture and our hypotheses. The thesis finds that on an aggregate level acquiring compa-
nies’ abnormal returns do not differ significantly from zero with a slight positive indica-
tion of 0.21% in a three day event window. Most of the previous literature supports the 
notion of positive or zero returns, e.g. Jarrell & Poulsen (1989), Jensen & Ruback 
(1983) and Dodd & Ruback (1977). On a Nordic perspective Lyyra, (1999), Karppinen 
(2001) and a more recent study form Hänninen (2014) find the similar pattern. A slight 
positive return seems intuitive since if the returns would be consistently negative, mak-
ing acquisitions would be pointless. Although this assertion lies on the premise that in-
vestor are able to capture the long term benefits in a three day trading window. 
 
Results for hypotheses two to five give more controversial results compared to previous 
literature and our original hypotheses. Our regression model finds that SCAR is posi-
tively correlated with deals associated with cash and hybrid financing whereas stock 
financed deals show negative correlation. However, only the study of hybrid financing 
is statistically significant from the three aforementioned consideration details studied. 
The regression analysis shows that cross-border transactions create less value than 
transaction where both the acquirer and the target were based in the same country. Ad-
ditionally we find that the returns of cross-border acquisitions are negatively correlated. 
The SCAR of acquisition of a private company, compared to a publicly listed stock 
company, are positively correlated. Moreover, the same pattern is seen in tender offers. 
However, both variables were deemed statistically insignificant.  
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Table 14: Summary of the findings  
Hypothesis Findings 
H1: “Acquisitions create positive or close 
to zero returns on an aggregate level for 
the sample.” 
Our study supports this hypothesis with an 
aggregate of 0.21% return for the total 
sample. 
H2: “Acquisitions that are financed with 
cash yield greater returns than do those 
that are financed with stock on a SCAR 
basis. The market reaction for acquisitions 
financed with both cash and stock are ex-
pected to have greater returns than those 
financed solely with stock. Consequently 
all stock financed acquisitions are ex-
pected to generate the least returns.” 
The respective hypothesis is partly sup-
ported by the findings of this thesis, since 
stock financed acquisitions indeed create 
the least returns. However, we find that 
hybrid financing created highest returns of 
all studied consideration details. Addition-
ally we find that the samples of cash and 
stock financed deals are not statistically 
significant and accept the null hypothesis. 
H3: “Cross-border acquisitions yield 
higher SCAR than acquisitions in which 
both the acquirer and the target are based 
in the same country” 
Our findings suggest that the notion of 
cross-border acquisition yielding a higher 
return, opposed to transaction in which the 
acquirer and the target are based in the 
same country, is flawed based on our sam-
ple. Cross-border acquisitions generated 
returns of 0.1% on an aggregate level 
compared to 0.4% in non-cross-border 
deals. 
H4: “Acquisitions of private firms yield 
greater returns than those that involve 
acquiring a publicly listed company for 
the acquirer. Furthermore we expect that 
an acquisition of any other type of illiquid 
asset creates greater returns in compari-
son to more liquid assets.” 
The thesis finds that if the target is a pri-
vate company, opposed to a publicly listed 
stock company, the returns are in fact 
greater than in an event of an acquisition 
of a publicly listed company. However the 
deviations in returns are insignificant 
compared to the total sample thus the re-
sults are not statistically significant. 
H5: “Tender offers yield lower returns 
compared to acquisitions or other transac-
tions that are solicited by the executive 
board.” 
Hypothesis 5 is rejected due to weak sta-
tistical significance support, which is a 
result of the uneven distribution of the 
variable in the sample. 
 
 
Table 14 summarises the findings against our relevant hypotheses. In hypothesis 2 we 
suggest that financing the financing decision of a transaction has relevance to abnormal 
returns. The underlying notion is that the type of financing signals the market partici-
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pants various things, such as the valuation of the target, the current state of the compa-
ny’s balance sheet, future expectation of the target, synergies or the management senti-
ment. The thesis discusses the relevant theoretical frameworks of the aforementioned 
subjects in sub-chapters 2.5 to 2.6 
 
Form of financing used can be interpreted in several ways; According to Myers & Maj-
luf (1984) if the company is paying for the acquisition with cash it might signal that the 
acquirers stock is undervalued and on the contrary if the payment is financed with stock 
it might be a signal of overvaluation. This is a commonly referred phenomenon and 
could be one of the reasons why this thesis shows a similar pattern i.e. cash financed 
deals have higher returns than stock financed. Roll (1986), in turn, suggests that when 
the acquirer places a bid on a target it might suggest that the unannounced cash flows 
could be higher. Using cash to finance such acquisition would be the logical way to 
move forward since the current valuation should equal only the information that is pub-
licly available to market participants, as the market efficiency theorem suggests. How-
ever, we did not conduct any interviews or did not verify the motives of each deal and 
thus it is speculation which of these aforementioned reasons would be the most relevant. 
 
Differing views exist related to the financing type; e.g. Eckbo (1990) states that mergers 
which are financed with cash, do not have the signaling effect, because the value of the 
target is easily visible and the acquirer does not have as big of a risk in overpaying. 
However, he does not take into account the notion that a company might be using cash 
as consideration since it lacks other viable uses for its cash or does not believe that its 
stock is underpriced and does not want to use stock for acquisition.  
 
Most studies, such as Travlos (1987) and Moeller et al. (2004), find that cash financed 
acquisitions tend to yield greatest abnormal returns, however this thesis finds hybrid 
financing might provide to be a better mean of financing. Travlos (1987) and Moeller et 
al. (2004) find that cash deals yield better results compared to hybrid financed deals, but 
Eckbo (2000) has a different view that supports greater returns for hybrid deals. As dis-
cussed in previous chapters valid arguments to support the findings could be the notion 
that hybrid financing is reducing the risk of overpaying via the stock component. An-
other theory could be that hybrid financing is used in the absence of sufficient cash re-
serves. This means that firms with less cash slack would use hybrid financing and the 
positive effect of debt burden would reduce managerial hubris and empire building.  
Moreover, as Seth et al. (2000) and Roll (1986) suggest both kind of management be-
havior results in bad M&A returns. Jensen (1986) argues that transactions are some-
times used to dispose excess cash. This in turn might indicate that cash financed acqui-
sitions are not as well considered in contrast to acquisitions made in a state of limited 
cash resources. Even though this thesis did not include interviews or study motives be-
hind each acquisition and hence it is speculation, which reason proved to be the deter-
mining factor behind the type of financing used, we can confirm hypothesis two with 
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some uncertainty on the reasons behind the relation between returns from cash financed 
deals and hybrid financed deals. 
 
Hypothesis three suggest that cross-border acquisitions create higher returns than acqui-
sitions with the acquirer and the target based in the same country. The hypothesis is 
based on the previous literature e.g. Danbolt (1966) and Kang (1993), who suggest that 
cross-border acquisitions create greater returns opposed to non-cross-border. However, 
contrary views exist to those of Danbolt and Kang’s. For example Harris and Ravencraft 
(1991), Georgen and Renneboog (2004) and Aybar and Ficici (2009) find close to zero 
returns. Kang (1993) finds that multinational firms tend to have competitive advantage 
over local ones and therefore argues that cross-border acquisitions create greater returns. 
Other reason for greater returns argued previously are the volatility of returns due to 
greater risk in cross-border returns, which in a large sample should even out, but in a 
smaller sample might skew the results into either positive or negative side. This can be 
seen by the volatility of results of previous studies. Additionally, as discussed in the 
theoretical background, entering new markets is a synergy that is seen more realistic to 
realize than pricing power or other synergies that are present when acquiring a company 
that is operating in the same market. Even though with high uncertainty, we argue that 
cross-border mergers yield worse returns compared to non-cross-border mergers in a 
Nordic context. 
 
Hypotheses four states that acquisitions of a private company opposed to a publicly 
listed company provide greater returns for the asset. The Hypothesis is based on the 
notion that illiquidity of an asset entails a discount on the price. Illiquidity discounts are 
a widely studied area and the academic as well as professional parties utilize different 
kind of discounts when valuing illiquid assets. Fuller et al. (2002) find that bidder gains 
when buying a private firm but loses when acquiring a public one. They argue that il-
liquidity of private companies is one of the reasons for a discount and hence the cumu-
lative abnormal returns for the acquirer in private firm acquisitions are correlated posi-
tively with the size of the target. Similar results are found by Chang (1998) who finds 
that when private firms are acquired with cash, significant positive returns are expected. 
When the consideration is paid with stock the returns are lower, but positive. Hansen 
and Lott (1996) find a similar pattern with Fuller (2000); when the bidder is acquiring a 
private firm bidders experience 2 % higher returns than when acquiring a public one. 
However Damodaran (2010) argues that assets that are less liquid have historically 
earned higher returns. i.e. smaller returns for the acquirer. 
 
Illiquidity is caused by several components; trading costs for an asset comprise of bro-
kerage cost, bid-Ask spread, price impact or opportunity costs, or a combination of 
them. Brokerage cost is the most explicit of the costs that any investor pays, but it is by 
far the smallest component. Opportunity cost could be argued to be the most relevant 
since discounts tend to be greater the fewer the bidder pool is. Examples of such phe-
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nomenon are multiple with one recent transaction of Kesko’s acquisition of Suomen 
Lähikauppa; Due to dynamics of the respective industry in Finland only few market 
participants were able to make an offer, which in turn yielded a huge return on the valu-
ation. Additionally smaller publicly listed companies that could be considered illiquid 
might be undervalued due to constrained analyst coverage resulting in information 
asymmetry.  
 
Hypothesis five suggests that tender offers or other unsolicited bids create smaller re-
turns compared to bids solicited by the management board. The hypothesis is intuitive 
due to several reasons. First, in unsolicited bids the acquirer has less information and 
has to act on publicly available information. Companies usually give out as little bad 
information as is allowed while remaining in the regulatory framework. Second, bids 
made directly to the shareholders usually evoke some defensive tactics from the man-
agement of the company, hence pushing the bid price up. Third, regulatory requirements 
require a certain threshold to be reached in order for the acquirer to make a successful 
acquisition. In other words the bid must be lucrative for a most of the shareholders, even 
the ones that would rather not sell their shares. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS
The ambition of this study was to study the effect of corporate acquisition announce-
ments to shareholder value by examining the performance of the underlying share price 
of acquiring companies listed in NASDAQ’s Nordic stock exchanges. Share perfor-
mance was studied for acquisitions that took place between 2005 and 2010 in order to 
capture both pre- and post-financial crisis performance. The two main objectives of the 
study were, first, to examine if M&A transactions create or destroy value and if so, how 
much and second, to examine the contribution of transaction specific factors to value 
creation in M&A transactions. 
 
The M&A field has been widely studied since 1970’s and vast amount of research has 
been conducted with different objectives and variables ranging from accounting to be-
havioral studies. This thesis aimed to shed light to previously studied subjects, but in a 
Nordic perspective, which has not been as widely studied due to the size of the market 
and available data. Additionally this study uses a five minute interval, which is signifi-
cantly shorter interval compared to most studies. The results of this thesis are mainly 
consistent with evidence from other markets and M&A theoretical background, on 
which the five hypotheses of this study were grounded on.  
 
The study found that on an aggregate level during a three day event window, the stand-
ardized cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer is positive although the magnitude 
of the return is relatively small. Also the abnormal returns increase rapidly during the 
first 15 minutes after the announcement, which can be interpreted so that investors do 
not have previous knowledge of the acquisition, but still react immediately to the acqui-
sition announcement. The first argument supports the premise of low information 
asymmetry and the latter argument asserts that the markets acts efficiently in a manner 
that the new information concerning the underlying stock is reflected in the share price 
during the first 15 minutes of trading after the announcement. 
 
We also find that acquisitions that were financed with stock create lesser returns com-
pared to cash or hybrid consideration with a negative regression co-efficient. The result 
suggests that, as according to theory, using stock as consideration signals that the ac-
quirers stock might be overvalued. Also, combination of cash and stock was found to 
yield better performance over cash finance acquisitions. This may indicate that investors 
believe that using cash as consideration entails financial slack, which in turn signals a 
possibility of managerial hubris or empire building to be a motive of the transaction. 
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However, previous literature has controversial findings on the financing decision so 
further scrutinizing should be done on the motives of the means of payment. 
 
According to previous research cross-border M&A yields greater returns compared to 
non-cross-border deals, however we find that cross-border transactions provide positive, 
but smaller returns compared to non-cross border acquisitions. The controversial return 
might be affected by the volatility of returns and sample size; cross-border transactions 
entail greater risk and hence greater volatility in returns. In a large sample the volatility 
should even out, however, it is suggested to further examine the cross-border returns 
with a larger sample. We also find that acquisitions of private companies yield greater 
returns compared to acquisitions of listed companies supporting the hypothesis of an 
illiquidity discount. However, the results are not statistically significant. 
 
Finally, we assess whether tender offers show a correlation between abnormal returns. 
We find that the correlation is positive and that tender offers yield greater returns com-
pared solicited acquisitions. The result is intuitive due to greater premiums in tender 
offers due to several factors such as information constraints, regulation and defense tac-
tics. However, again, the results are not statistically significant due to the small amount 
of unsolicited tender offers, which is natural for the Nordic market where most of the 
bids are usually solicited. 
 
The underlying thesis has some limitations, including sample size, qualitative aspects of 
motives behind various variables as well as capturing only the short term performance. 
The limitations of the study provide potential for further research, which could be aimed 
to replicate the study with a larger sample and conducting qualitative analyses as a sup-
port for the stock performance measures. Such analyses could include mapping the mo-
tives of the used consideration type and rationale for expanding operations across bor-
ders. Using detailed qualitative analyses could give more insight on the reasons behind 
the results and give further implications for the results. Additionally an interesting topic 
for future research would be to conduct an accounting study in conjunction with a 
shareholder value study, to capture the long-term benefits of transactions. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF COMPANIES INCLUDED IN 
THE SAMPLE
 
Panostaja Oyj Oriola-KD A
Kinnevik A Rapala VMC
Aldata Solutions Sanoma Oyj
Ericsson A Pöyry Oyj
ICA Gruppen Raisio
Atria Oyj A Readsoft
LBI international TeliaSonera
Metso Oyj Alma Media Oyj
Wulff-Yhtiöt Oyj F-Secure Oyj
Basware Oyj Tryg
Teleste Oyj Lundbeck
Lindab International Terveystalo
Revenio Group Oyj Vaisala Oyj A
Julius Tallberg kiinteistöt Biotie Therapies Oyj
Transcom worldwide Olvi Oyj A
Turvatiimi Affecto Oyj
Takoma Oyj A.P. Møller - Mærsk A
G4S plc Millicom Int. Cellular SDB
Outotec Oyj Tieto Oyj
Afarak Group Fortum Oyj
Soprano Oyj Vacon
Rocla Dovre Group
Evia Oyj Stockmann Oyj Abp B
Topsil Semiconductor Materials Trainers´ House Oyj
Aspo Oyj Technopolis Oyj
Pohjola Pankki Kaupthing
Rejlers Citycon Oyj
Bure Equity A-Com
Perlos KappAhl
Kemira Oyj Keops
Ixonos Oyj TradeDoubler
Securitas B Etteplan Oyj
Bittium Oyj Glaston Oyj Abp
Fiskars Oyj Abp Codan
Ahlstrom Oyj Invik Co
Oral hammaslääkärit Componenta Oyj
Kesla A Nokia Oyj
EVOX Rifa AstraZeneca
Lemminkäinen Oyj FLSmidth & Co.
SSH Communications Security United Int. Enterprises
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INDICES USED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nasdaq Helsinki
Nasdaq Stockholm
Nasdaq Copenhagen
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APPENDIX 3: DELISTINGS 
 
Company Name Exchange:Ticker Key Developments by Type -  [1/1/2005-12/31/2010] Geographic Locations
AB Electrolux (publ) (OM:ELUX B) OM:ELUX B 12/16/2009  (Delistings)
Electrolux Applies For Delisting From LSE 
9/4/2007  (Delistings)
Electrolux To Apply For Deregistration With SEC
3/14/2005  (Delistings)
Electrolux To Delist Shares From Nasdaq On March 31
2/15/2005  (Delistings)
Electrolux To Delist ADRs From NASDAQ
Sw eden (Primary)
AB Volvo (publ) (OM:VOLV B) OM:VOLV B 12/13/2007  (Delistings)
Volvo AB Files SEC Form 15
12/3/2007  (Delistings)
Volvo Files For Delisting From NASDAQ
6/14/2007  (Delistings)
Volvo Applies For Delisting From The NASDAQ Stock 
Exchange
Sw eden (Primary)
AcadeMedia AB (OM:ACAD) OM:ACAD 07/23/2010  (Delistings)
AcadeMedia Requests For Delisting Of Shares From 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB
4/28/2010  (Delistings)
AcadeMedia Shares To Be Delisted From OMX, Upon The 
Completion Of Acquisition
Sw eden (Primary)
Alm. Brand Pantebreve A/S - 12/07/2010  (Delistings)
Alm. Brand Pantebreve To Delist From NASDAQ OMX 
Copenhagen A/S
Denmark (Primary)
Amer Sports Corp. (HLSE:AMEAS) HLSE:AMEAS 06/23/2005  (Delistings)
Amer Sports Delisting From London stock Exchange 
Approved
5/25/2005  (Delistings)
Amer To Cancel Secondary Listing In London
Finland (Primary)
Atlas Copco AB (OM:ATCO A) OM:ATCO A 04/27/2005  (Delistings)
Atlas Copco To Delist From Frankfurt Exchange In July
2/7/2005  (Delistings)
Atlas Copco Cancels Secondary Listing At The Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange
1/14/2005  (Delistings)
Atlas Copco AB To Delist A And B Shares
Sw eden (Primary)
Axactor AB (publ) (OB:AXA) OB:AXA 04/22/2009  (Delistings)
International Gold Exploration To Be Delisted
Sw eden (Primary)
Borås Wäfveri AB - 11/04/2010  (Delistings)
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm To Delist Borås Wäfveri
Sw eden (Primary)
C.I.S.L. Gruppen AB - 02/05/2008  (Delistings)
CISL Gruppen To Delist From First North
12/27/2005  (Delistings)
CISL Moves to Nya Marknaden
Sw eden (Primary)
CashGuard AB - 08/12/2008  (Delistings)
CashGuard AB Files Application For Delisting Of Its B-
share With OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm
Sw eden (Primary)
Chips Ab - 05/27/2005  (Delistings)
Chips Abp Applies For Delisting From Helsinki Exchange
Finland (Primary)
Curalogic A/S - 11/21/2008  (Delistings)
Curalogic A/S Might Delist From OMX
Denmark (Primary)
D. Carnegie & Co AB (publ) 
(OM:DCAR B)
OM:DCAR B 12/23/2008  (Delistings)
D. Carnegie To Voluntarily Delist From NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm
Sw eden (Primary)
Dansk Industri Invest A/S - 03/30/2009  (Delistings)
Dantherm's Unit Seeks Partner
Denmark (Primary)
Deltek Danmark A/S - 06/03/2010  (Delistings)
Maconomy To Apply For Delisting Of Shares From Nasdaq 
OMX
Denmark (Primary)
Europe Vision plc - 10/01/2007  (Delistings)
Europe Vision Eyes Delisting On AIM
Sw eden (Primary)
EuroTrust A/S - 05/30/2007  (Delistings)
EuroTrust To Be Delisted From Nasdaq Global Market
5/3/2007  (Delistings)
EuroTrust Announces Intention To Delist From NASDAQ
Denmark (Primary)
Fazer Services AB - 01/12/2009  (Delistings)
Fazer Konfektyr To Delist From SSE
Sw eden (Primary)
Finnveden AB - 01/24/2005  (Delistings)
Finnveden AB To Delist On February 21
Sw eden (Primary)
Fortum Oyj (HLSE:FUM1V) HLSE:FUM1V 10/22/2008  (Delistings)
TGC-10 De-Listed From MICEX
Finland (Primary)
FS Finans III A/S - 07/27/2010  (Delistings)
Amagerbanken On Observation List Of Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange
Denmark (Primary)
IBS AB - 04/07/2009  (Delistings)
IBS AB To Transfer Listing From NASDAQ OMX Small Cap 
To First North
Sw eden (Primary)
Inion Oy - 06/23/2009  (Delistings)
Inion To Be Delisted
4/29/2009  (Delistings)
Inion To Be Delisted
Finland (Primary)
KapitalPleje A/S - 03/29/2010  (Delistings)
Kapitalpleje To Be Delisted From Trading And Official 
Listing On NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen
Denmark (Primary)
Ledstiernan AB - 03/04/2010  (Delistings)
Ledstiernan To Delist From NASDAQ OMX
Sw eden (Primary)
Morphic Technologies AB (publ) - 09/22/2009  (Delistings)
Morphic Technologies Might Get Delisted
Sw eden (Primary)
Munters AB - 12/07/2010  (Delistings)
Munters AB To Be Delisted From NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm AB
Sw eden (Primary)
NanoCover A/S - 12/30/2009  (Delistings)
NanoCover To Be Delisted
Denmark (Primary)
Nefab AB - 11/02/2007  (Delistings)
Nefab AB To Be Delisted From OMX Nordic Exchange 
Stockholm AB
Sw eden (Primary)
Neonet AB - 05/12/2010  (Delistings)
Neonet AB Announces Delisting From NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm AB
Sw eden (Primary)
Neonode, Inc. (NasdaqCM:NEON) NasdaqCM:NEON 02/20/2009  (Delistings)
Neonode’s Stock To Be Delisted On January 2
1/5/2009  (Delistings)
Neonode Receives Notice From NASDAQ
12/15/2008  (Delistings)
Neonode Receives NASDAQ Non-Compliance Letter
7/16/2008  (Delistings)
Neonode Nasdaq Received Letter From NASDAQ
7/2/2008  (Delistings)
Neonode Got A Staff Determination Letter From NASDAQ
Sw eden (Primary)
Nokia Corporation (HLSE:NOKIA) HLSE:NOKIA 01/25/2007  (Delistings)
Nokia Applies For Delisting From Stockholm Stock 
Exchange
Finland (Primary)
Nordea Bank AB (publ) (OM:NDA 
SEK)
OM:NDA SEK 02/02/2005  (Delistings)
Nordea To Delist Euro-denominated Share From Stockholm 
Stock Exchange
Sw eden (Primary)
North Atlantic Natural Resources AB - 04/12/2005  (Delistings)
NAN's Shares To Delist On April 29
Sw eden (Primary)
Olicom A/S - 06/18/2010  (Delistings)
Olicom To Delist From NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen
Denmark (Primary)
PA Resources AB (publ) - 11/23/2010  (Delistings)
PA Resources Approves To Apply For Delisting Of 
Shares From OSE
11/8/2010  (Delistings)
PA Resources Proposes To Apply For Delisting From OSE
Sw eden (Primary)
Potagua Højkol A/S - 06/03/2005  (Delistings)
Potagua B-shares To Delist With Effect From June 6
4/27/2005  (Delistings)
Potagua To Delist Its Shares From Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange
Denmark (Primary)
Potagua Kapital A/S - 02/23/2006  (Delistings)
Copenhagen Bourse Delists Potagua Kapital from Feb 24
Denmark (Primary)
Q-Med AB - 12/26/2007  (Delistings)
QMed Not In Compliance With NASDAQ Rule
Sw eden (Primary)
Spar Finland Ltd. - 05/11/2006  (Delistings)
Spar Finland To Apply For Delisting Of Shares From OMX 
Helsinki Stock Exchange 
Finland (Primary)
Technology Nexus AB - 09/02/2009  (Delistings)
Nexus Applies To Delist From NASDAQ OMX
Sw eden (Primary)
Tele2 AB (publ) (OM:TEL2 B) OM:TEL2 B 03/21/2005  (Delistings)
Tele2 To Delist From Nasdaq
Sw eden (Primary)
Ticket Travel Group AB (publ) - 04/18/2010  (Delistings)
Ticket Travel Requests Delisting From NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm
Sw eden (Primary)
Tricorona AB - 08/03/2010  (Delistings)
Tricorona AB Announces Delisting From NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm AB
Sw eden (Primary)
TV4 AB - 06/23/2005  (Delistings)
TV4 AB To Delist Stockholm Stock Exchange
5/24/2005  (Delistings)
TV4 AB May Delist From Stockholm Exchange
Sw eden (Primary)
Verisure Holding AB - 06/19/2008  (Delistings)
Securitas Direct To Be Delisted
Sw eden (Primary)
